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INTRODUCTION 
In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court 
created a new standard of review, enhanced business judgment, to monitor 
the decision of target directors to enact defensive tactics against a hostile 
tender offer.
1
 Shortly thereafter, the Delaware Supreme Court applied 
enhanced business judgment to monitor target directors’ actions when a 
corporation is in a “Revlon mode.”
2
  Cases after Unocal labeled this new 
standard of review as an “intermediate level of judicial review.”
3
  One court 
wrote that “Unocal has correctly been described as ‘the most innovative 
 
       1.   493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that “there is an enhanced duty which calls 
for judicial examination at the threshold. . .”); see also Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., The 
Missing Link in Sarbanes-Oxley: Enactment of the “Change of Control Board” Concept, or 
Extension of the Audit Committee Provisions to Mergers and Acquisitions, 63 Bus. Law. 81, 
87-88 (2007) (“In the famous Case of Unocal . . . the Delaware Supreme Court adopted 
what has become known as the ‘enhanced business judgment rule’ . . .”). 
 2.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) 
(applying enhanced business judgment to Revlon); see infra Part II.B.  Only a few fact 
patterns currently trigger “Revlon” analysis.  For a discussion of when corporations are in a 
“Revlon mode” see infra note 137. 
 3.  See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 947 (Del. 2003) (Steele, 
J., dissenting) (noting that Unocal’s intermediate standard of review requires judicial 
review); Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting that 
Unocal is a “flexible, intermediate standard of review”); Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings 
Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (“[E]nhanced 
scrutiny is a ‘middle ground’ between deference to the board under the business judgment 
rule and skepticism toward the board under entire fairness review.”); Keyser v. Curtis, No. 
7109-VCN, 2012 WL 3115453, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2012) (“a specific iteration of the 
intermediate standard of review”), aff’d sub nom., Poliak v. Keyser, 65 A.3d 617 (Del. 
2013); Reis v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 28 A.3d 442, 457 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Enhanced 
scrutiny is Delaware’s intermediate standard of review.”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. 
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 93 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“[T]he Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal 
created an intermediate standard of review applying enhanced scrutiny to board action 
before directors would be entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule.”); eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“the intermediate 
standard of enhanced scrutiny, typically referred to as the Unocal test”); Yucaipa Am. 
Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 331 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“Unocal’s intermediate 
review standard”); In re Unitrin, Inc. S’holders Litig., Nos. 13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994) (noting that Unocal provides an “intermediate standard of judicial 
scrutiny”), rev’d sub nom., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995); 
Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123-24 (Del. Ch. 1990) (applying the 
“intermediate form of business judgment review identified in Unocal”); Blasius Indus., Inc. 
v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988) (calling Unocal an intermediate level of 
review); Robert M. Bass Grp. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988) (citing 
Unocal as an intermediate standard of review); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Interco 
Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988) (arguing that the Unocal “created a new 
intermediate form of judicial review”); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 
519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (labeling Unocal as “a more flexible, intermediate form 
of judicial review”).  
SIEGEL_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:52 PM 
2014] PROBLEMS AND PROMISE  49 
 
and promising’ case in our corporation law and one whose insights ‘will [] 
continue to resonate with judges.’”
4
 
Enhanced business judgment has the potential to be such a useful tool 
in the array of standards of review that extending this standard to other 
aspects of corporate law besides tender offer and Revlon contexts can be 
tempting.  Therefore, in order to be able to evaluate which scenarios are 
suitable for review under this standard, this Article analyzes the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s original design for enhanced business judgment review, 
how this review currently operates, and its premises.  Part I of this Article 
briefly describes various standards of review to showcase why the 
Delaware Supreme Court felt the need to create an additional standard of 
review. Part I then traces the creation of enhanced business judgment and 
evaluates the efficacy of this standard.  Part II explains the logic of 
enhanced business judgment so as to understand the issues to which this 
standard of review can respond and the topics to which enhanced business 
judgment has thus far been applied.  Based on the dissection of enhanced 
business judgment review that Part II provides, Part III tweaks the standard 
to provide a more meaningful review.  Thereafter, Part III discusses two 
topics that could merit review under this standard as well as the costs and 
benefits of extending enhanced review.  Finally, Part III considers the 
effect, if any, that a shareholder vote should have on the applicable 
standard of review. 
I. THE COMPETITION AND THE CONTENDER 
A. The Competition 
It is only by placing the Unocal standard of review among others used 
by Delaware courts that the nature of the problem emerges: Delaware’s 
standards of review diverge widely, thereby creating a cavernous gap 
among them.  In a spectrum demarcating when directors will be liable for 
breaching their fiduciary duties, the business judgment rule sits on the end 
of the spectrum where imposition of liability is rare.
5
  The reason for the 
 
 4.  eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 31 (Del. Ch. 2010) (citation 
omitted) (quoting William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great 
Takeover Debate: A Mediation on Bringing the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 
1093 (2002)). 
 5.  Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law 
and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 
179-80 (2001) (“As a practical matter, the presumption established by the business 
judgment rule is all but impossible to overcome, at least in cases where directors lack any 
apparent conflict of interest . . . . So in Delaware, the business judgment rule goes much of 
the way towards putting disinterested business decisions beyond judicial scrutiny.”); Lyman 
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infrequency of liability results from two factors.  First, the rule presumes 
that the directors “acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”
6
  Plaintiffs face an uphill battle rebutting this presumption.
7
  
Second, unless the plaintiff can make a prima facie case that the directors 
violated one of their fiduciary duties,
8
 the rule allows the court to review 
only the decision-making process.  The board’s decision, however, is not 
reviewable for its wisdom or reasonableness.
9
  While some formulations of 
the business judgment rule state that courts can review the decision for its 
rationality or for waste,
10
 even that standard makes the board’s decision 
virtually unreviewable.
11
  Since plaintiffs face a high hurdle to generate 
facts that support a showing of fiduciary breach, they have scored few 
victories under the business judgment rule.
12
  Such a pro-board standard of 
 
Johnson, Rethinking Judicial Review of Director Care, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 787, 791-92 
(1999) (noting that plaintiffs rarely prevail when the business judgment rule applies).  But 
see Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 1985) (applying business judgment rule 
to board’s decision to enter into third-party merger agreement, but finding board violated the 
rule). 
 6.  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 7.  See supra text accompanying note 6; see also In re Citigroup S’holder Litig., 964 
A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“Accordingly, the burden required for a plaintiff to rebut the 
presumption of the business judgment rule . . . is a difficult one).  
 8.  Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996) (“Only by demonstrating that 
the Board breached its fiduciary duties may the presumption of the business judgment rule 
be rebutted.”); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, No. 17727, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42, at 
*11–12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2000) (reasoning that unless the presumption of the business 
judgment rule is sufficiently rebutted by the plaintiff creating a “reasonable doubt about 
self-interest or independence, the Court must defer to the discretion of the board”); see also 
1 STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE 
DIRECTORS, 53–55 (6th ed. 2009) (supporting the idea that a violation of fiduciary duties of 
corporate directors allows the court to review more than the decision-making process). 
 9.  Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 787 (2006) (“The business judgment rule therefore builds a 
prophylactic barrier by which courts pre-commit to resisting the temptation to review the 
merits of the board’s decision.”). 
 10.  Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (“Irrationality is the outer limit of 
the business judgment rule.  Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test 
or it may tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient 
of the business judgment rule.”) (citations omitted); see also Julian Velasco, Structural Bias 
and the Need For Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 821, 840 (2004) (“The outer limit 
for substantive overreaching—irrationality or waste—is virtually unworthy of mention.”). 
 11.  Velasco, supra note 10, at 830 (stating that judicial review of the rationality of the 
board’s decision makes the “business judgment rule ‘presumption’ . . . nearly irrebuttable 
with respect to substance”). 
 12.  See supra text accompanying note 5.  See Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 
(Del. 1996) (explaining that plaintiffs seldom success in derivative suits because 
“stockholder plaintiffs must overcome the powerful presumptions of the business judgment 
rule”); Polk v. Goode, 507 A.2d 531, 535-36 (Del. 1986) (acknowledging that 
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review is deliberate, as many excellent rationales for the business judgment 
rule exist.
13
  One Delaware chancery court explained well one of the most 
important of these reasons: 
 
The business judgment rule serves to protect and promote the role 
of the board as the ultimate manager of the corporation.  Because 
courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc substantive review 
of business decisions, the business judgment rule ‘operates to 
preclude a court from imposing itself unreasonably on the 
business and affairs of a corporation.’
14
 
 
In contrast, at the other end of the spectrum are two standards of 
review: the Blasius test, and the entire fairness test.  The Blasius test 
applies to those situations where directors’ primary purpose is to 
disenfranchise their shareholders; in that event, directors must demonstrate 
a compelling justification for their actions.
15
  Two reasons account for the 
courts’ infrequent invocation of the Blasius test.  One is that the factual 
limitations of Blasius make the test inapplicable to voting situations outside 
of voting for directors.
16
  Thus, in Blasius, Chancellor Allen recognized this 
point by distinguishing the facts of that case from those in Unocal, noting 
the latter involved issues of the “corporation’s power over its property, or 
with respect to its rights or obligations”
17
 while the Blasius facts involve 
 
“notwithstanding the plaintiffs[‘]. . .difficult task in overcoming the protections of the 
business judgment rule,” the settlement negotiated by the directors satisfied their fiduciary 
duties); Paula J. Dalley, The Business Judgment Rule: What You Thought You Knew, 60 
Cons. Fin. L. Q. Rep. 24, 25 (2006) (arguing that it is “almost impossible” for a plaintiff to 
overcome the presumption of the business judgment rule). 
 13.  Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 599, 603-04 (2013) (explaining that the business judgment rule maximizes shareholder 
value by enabling directors to take risks without fear of being held personally liable for 
potential losses, encourages qualified individuals to become directors, prevents judges from 
making business decisions, and ensures that directors, not shareholders, manage the 
corporation). 
 14.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del. Ch. 2005) aff’d, 
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (citation omitted) (citing Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 
A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993)). 
 15.  Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659, 661–62 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 16.  See, e.g., Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware) Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 809 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
(noting that MM Companies v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003) signaled 
“that the stringency of the Blasius approach should be reserved largely for director election 
contests or election contests having consequences for corporate control”); see also In re 
MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 675 n. 51 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Blasius is 
not easily or readily applied outside the context of matters touching on directorial control, as 
its demanding standard could unduly limit the legitimate exercise of directorial power and 
discretion in other contexts.”). 
 17.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 660 (Del. Ch. 1988).  But see infra Part II.B (describing 
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the “ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial 
power rests.”
18
  The second is that the courts are reluctant to invoke the 
Blasius test given that it is virtually outcome determinative: once the 
directors have the requisite purpose, it appears impossible to provide the 
court with a sufficiently compelling justification so as to pass the test.
19
  As 
a result, then Vice-Chancellor Strine has argued that the Blasius test is 
effectively a holding, rather than a true standard of review.
20
 
Still stringent but somewhat less so, the entire fairness test is the 
standard of review for conflict-of-interest transactions.
21
  A conflict of 
 
chancery court proposal to apply Unocal review to Blasius fact pattern); infra Part III.B 
(discussing the appropriate voting fact-patterns for Blasius review). 
 18.  Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659. 
 19.  Thus far, only five cases, four by the Delaware chancery courts and one by the 
Delaware Supreme Court, have triggered the Blasius test, and only one passed. See MM 
Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1132 (Del. 2003) (invalidating bylaw 
amendment that expanded the size of Liquid Audio’s board because of lack of compelling 
justification under Blasius); Mercier, 929 A.2d at 787 (finding that a special committee 
satisfied the compelling justification under Blasius for postponing a shareholder vote on a 
merger that independent directors believed was in the best interests of shareholders); 
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 297 (Del. Ch. 2000) (striking down a 
supermajority bylaw amendment because it interfered with a shareholder vote and lacked a 
compelling justification under Blasius); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., No. 
17637, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 170, at *17-18 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000) (denying a motion for 
summary judgment because of the applicability of Blasius to the board’s decision to adjourn 
a shareholder meeting); Carmody v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Del. Ch. 
1998) (finding a cognizable Blasius claim regarding a “dead hand” provision because of the 
provision’s effect on shareholders’ ability to elect a board that would accept a takeover 
offer).  Cf. Mercier, 929 A.2d at 788–89, 812–13 (applying a reformulated Blasius test to 
look more like the Unocal test, which defendant passed, but then concluding that since a 
chancery court cannot overrule the Delaware Supreme Court’s affirmation of Blasius, 
holding that the defendant satisfied the Blasius test as well); Hollinger Int’l, Inc. v. Black, 
844 A.2d 1022, 1089 (Del. Ch. 2004) (determining that Blasius did not apply, but if it did, 
the board had a compelling justification for enacting a rights plan that had an incidental 
burden on voting rights). 
 20.  Mercier, 929 A.2d at 806 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[T]he trigger for the test’s 
application—director action that has the primary purpose of disenfranchisement—is so 
pejorative that it is more a label for a result than a useful guide to determining what standard 
of review should be used by a judge to reach an appropriate result.”) (citations omitted); see 
also infra Part II.B (discussing the merits of Mercier’s argument that Blasius review should 
be replaced by enhanced business judgment). 
 21.  See Kahn v. Tremont Corp, 694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (“Ordinarily, in a 
challenged transaction involving self-dealing by a controlling shareholder, the substantive 
legal standard is that of entire fairness”); Kahn v. Roberts, No. 12324, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
151, at * 13–14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 6, 1995) (explaining that, in an interested director 
transaction, “courts generally will bypass the business judgment rule and conduct an entire 
fairness analysis on the challenged transaction”); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986) (holding that “where a self-interested 
corporate fiduciary has set the terms of a transaction and caused its effectuation, it will be 
required to establish the entire fairness of the transaction”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSIE 
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interest is one of several types of fact patterns that raise an issue of 
directors’ compliance with their duty of loyalty.
22
  Once the court 
acknowledges that plaintiffs have raised a cognizable loyalty issue, 
defendants bear the burden of proving “all aspects of the issue . . . as a 
whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”
23
  Thus, like the business 
judgment rule, the entire fairness standard of review has both a procedural 
and a substantive component,
24
 but this is where the similarity ends.  Under 
the entire fairness test, defendants must prove that both the board’s process 
and its decision were fair to the corporation and to the shareholders.
25
  
Because the court conducts a searching and pervasive inquiry under the 
entire fairness review,
26
 few defendants successfully satisfy this exacting 
scrutiny.
27
 
In sum, at one end of the spectrum, directors rarely lose when courts 
 
A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 
4.19B at 4-172 (2011 Supp.) (“If the business judgment rule’s presumption is rebutted, the 
burden shifts to the defendant directors to show the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction.”). 
 22.  The traditional description of directors’ duty of loyalty violation is that “they were 
greedy and put their own financial interests ahead of the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders.” FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, 1 CORPORATION LAW 321 (2d ed. 2010).  “Questions 
of a director’s duty of loyalty generally arise when the director (1) competes with the 
company, or (2) takes for herself a ‘corporate opportunity’ or (3) has some personal 
pecuniary interest in a corporation’s decision.”  DAVID G. EPSTEIN, RICHARD D. FREER, 1 
MICHAL J. ROBERTS & GEORGE B. SHEPHERD, BUSINESS STRUCTURES 233 (3d ed. 2007). 
 23.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983); see also Cinerama, Inc. 
v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1164 (Del. 1995) (“From a procedural perspective, the 
breach of any one of the board’s fiduciary duties is enough to shift the burden of proof to the 
board to demonstrate entire fairness.”); R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSIE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE 
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.19B at 4-172 (2011 
Supp.) (“If the business judgment rule’s presumption is rebutted, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors to show the ‘entire fairness’ of the transaction.”). 
 24.  Velasco, supra note 10 at 836.  
 25.  See, e.g., Strassburger v. Earley, 752 A.2d 557, 570 (Del. Ch. 2000) (“Under [the 
entire fairness test], where the controlling shareholder and the directors stand on both sides 
of the transaction, they bear the burden to demonstrate that the transaction was entirely fair 
to the corporation and the minority stockholders, both as to process and price.”). 
 26.  See, e.g., In re Digex, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1207 (Del. Ch. 2000) 
(noting the “careful scrutiny” required under entire fairness review); Linton v. Everett, No. 
15219, 1997 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *17 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1997) (holding that issuance by 
directors of shares to themselves did not satisfy the “rigorous standard” of entire fairness); 
see also 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.19[B][A], at 4-172 (Supp. 2012) 
(describing the “heavy burden” of showing entire fairness). 
 27.  See Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ 
Duties in Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part I), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1320 (1995) 
(asserting that when the court applies the entire fairness standard of review, the plaintiff will 
likely win).  But see Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1370 (Del. 1993) (holding that 
directors satisfied the entire fairness test in enacting a stock repurchase program limited to 
shareholders who were also employees). 
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apply the business judgment rule, and at the other end of the spectrum, 
directors rarely succeed when courts apply Blasius or the entire fairness 
test.  Thus, when it considered board responses to hostile offers, the 
Delaware Supreme Court faced doctrinal choices that were both too limited 
and too extreme. It is therefore not surprising that the Delaware Supreme 
Court in Unocal created a standard that falls between these polar opposites.  
In fact, the wonder is that Delaware courts did not do so sooner.
28
 
B. The Contender: Enhanced Business Judgment 
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal faced the issue of how to 
review the decision of target directors to respond to a hostile tender offer 
by making a conditional, selective self-tender offer.
29
  At the time, two 
competing hardline views existed regarding such review.  On the one hand, 
prominent corporate lawyer Martin Lipton was a strong proponent of the 
view that the board’s response should be treated no differently from any 
other decision it made, and therefore should be governed by the business 
judgment rule.
30
  Applying the business judgment rule to the board’s 
decision to enact defensive tactics is tantamount to giving directors carte 
blanche to enact almost all defensive tactics.
31
  In contrast to Mr. Lipton’s 
view, several legal academics offered various arguments as to why the 
court should prohibit the board from enacting any defensive tactic; those 
arguments ranged from a lack of statutory authority for the board to act,
32
 a 
 
 28.  Cf. Velasco, supra note 10, at 840 (noting that as “an all-or-nothing approach, 
employing either the entire fairness test or the business judgment rule, is inadequate to deal 
with all situations,” it was inevitable that courts would create an intermediate standard of 
review). 
 29.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 951–52 (Del. 1985). 
 30.  Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS. LAW. 101, 131 
(1979) (contending directors have the power to enact defensive tactics and concluding that 
the “business judgment rule applies to takeovers in the same manner as it applies to other 
major business decisions”); Leo Herzel, John R. Schmidt & Scott T. Davis, Why Corporate 
Directors Have a Right To Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REV. 107, 109 (1980) (arguing 
that the board’s power to bargain with, and ultimately reject, merger offers benefits 
shareholders). 
 31.  Because the business judgment rule is so deferential to director decisions, supra 
text accompanying notes 5–12, most or virtually all defensive tactics would pass this test. 
 32.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s 
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1200 (1981) 
(contending that directors should be passive in response to a tender offer because the 
corporate statute gives no role to the directors in a tender offer, unlike the statutory role 
given to directors in mergers and sales of all assets, and that tender offers act as “an 
essential safety valve to ensure that managers evaluate merger proposals in the best interests 
of the shareholders”); see also Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The 
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 849 (1981) (“The 
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literal argument that the offer does not involve the corporation because the 
offer is made to shareholders to sell their personal property,
33
 and a policy 
argument that the tender offer is the only realistic means to unseat 
entrenched target management and therefore should not be stymied by 
defensive tactics.
34
  Still others contended that target directors faced an 
inherent conflict of interest in dealing with hostile tender offers,
35
 thereby 
providing the court with a third avenue for review, the entire fairness test;
36
 
that test would have required the target directors to bear the burden of 
proving that their defensive tactic was entirely fair to the corporation.  In 
Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected all three of these options. 
Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal began with precedent 
involving directors’ defensive tactics.  Particularly relevant to the court was 
Cheff v. Mathes,
37
 a case involving a shareholder derivative suit alleging 
that directors of the Holland Furnace Corporation improperly used 
corporate funds to preserve their control by causing Holland to purchase 
shares owned by Arnold Maremont’s corporations after Maremont 
threatened to acquire Holland and liquidate its work force.
38
  Although the 
Delaware Court of Chancery held that the Holland directors had breached 
their fiduciary duties because Maremont had not threatened the company, 
the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Holland board reacted to a 
 
statutory silence regarding tender offers may simply reflect a legislative assumption that free 
alienation of property is the norm, so that management’s affirmative role in mergers and 
asset sales needs to be stated, while its nonrole in tender offers need not.”). 
 33.  MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 553 (1995) 
(discussing academic theories that argue that defensive tactics should be limited or 
prohibited so that stock can be treated like other property where only “the owner of an asset 
is free to accept or reject bids from others who wish to buy it”). 
 34.  Giving hostile bidder unfettered access to target shareholders “is precisely the 
structure reflected in the typical corporation statute” and further “the tender offer is the 
principal mechanism by which management can be forcibly unseated from control.”  See 
Gilson, supra note 32, at 819, 844, 847 (arguing that the “market for corporate control is the 
principal constraint on management self-dealing in important situations, and 
the tender offer is the only displacement mechanism which has the potential to effectuate 
that constraint”). However, as the number of proxy challenges initiated by institutional 
investors has increased, so has the success rate of proxy contests.  Lee Harris, Missing in 
Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 
145–53 (2010). 
 35.  Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do About It), 26 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 495 (2001) (explaining that a hostile tender offer forces management 
to face “an inherent conflict of interest in confronting a transaction that directly threatens 
both their positions and their egos.  Deploying defensive tactics thus resembles an interested 
transaction that calls for review under the rigorous entire fairness standard.”). 
 36.  See supra text accompanying notes 21–25. 
 37.  199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964). 
 38.  Id. at 552–53. Holland paid Maremont a 43% premium over the market price for its 
Holland shares.   
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“reasonable threat to the continued existence of Holland” by Maremont’s 
plan.
39
  Since the Delaware corporate statute grants corporations the right to 
purchase their own stock,
40
 the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that 
the “charge here is not one of violation of statute, but the allegation is that 
the true motives behind such purchases were improperly centered upon 
perpetuation of control.”
41
  The court in Cheff then cited to Bennett v. 
Propp, a case also involving the purchase of shares with corporate funds 
when control was threatened, which concluded that those directors “are of 
necessity confronted with a conflict of interest, and an objective decision is 
difficult . . . [h]ence . . . the burden should be on the directors to justify 
such a purchase as one primarily in the corporate interest.”
42
  Thus, 
following Bennett’s conclusion that the board had a conflict of interest, the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff held that the burden of proof should lie 
with the defendant board.
43
 
In what would become a pivotal remark, the Delaware Supreme Court 
in Cheff cautioned that such burden-shifting did not signal that it viewed 
this conflict identically to the conflict-of-interest that directors face when 
they receive a tangible pecuniary benefit from the corporation.
44
  The court 
provided not only a sparse explanation for its reasoning, but also an 
explanation written in the negative: “To say that the burden of proof is 
upon the defendants is not to indicate, however, that the directors have the 
same ‘self-dealing interest’ as is present, for example, when a director sells 
property to the corporation.”
45
  Attempting to clarify the different types of 
conflicts, the court differentiated the interests of those directors who had a 
“pecuniary interest in the transaction”
46
 from the remaining directors who 
had no such direct interest but whose jobs would be more secure if the 
corporation neutralized Maremont’s offer.
47
  Since the directors claimed 
that Maremont’s offer threatened corporate policy, the court in Cheff 
 
 39.  Id. at 556. 
 40.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (2010). 
 41.  Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554. 
 42.  Id. (citing Bennett v. Propp, 187 A.2d 409, 409 (1962)). 
 43.  Id. at 504-05 (citing Bennett v. Propp) (requiring directors to bear the burden of 
proving that their repurchase plan is in the corporation’s best interest). 
 44.  Id. at 554–55; see also William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation 
Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1290 (2001) (“Since 1985, a third category has more clearly 
emerged: cases where the directors have no direct pecuniary interest in the transaction but 
have an ‘entrenchment’ interest, i.e., an interest in protecting their existing control of the 
corporation.”); see discussion infra Part II.A (discussing that enhanced business judgment is 
designed to monitor a motivational conflict). 
 45.  Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554. 
 46.  Id. at 554–55. 
 47.  Id. 
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evaluated whether the “defendants satisfied the burden of proof of showing 
reasonable grounds to believe a danger to corporate policy and 
effectiveness existed by the presence of the Maremont stock ownership” 
and that “directors satisfy their burden by showing good faith and 
reasonable investigation.”
48
  Finding that the board met this burden, the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff reversed the lower court, and upheld the 
board’s actions.
49
 
In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court built upon its Cheff analysis 
to create an enhanced standard of review for defensive tactics, which courts 
subsequently labeled the “enhanced” business judgment rule.
50
  Although in 
Cheff the defensive tactic was an offer to purchase only the bidder’s shares, 
and in Unocal the tactic was to purchase all shares except those of the 
bidder, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal, as it did in Cheff, first 
established statutory power for the board’s decision to respond defensively 
by offering to repurchase corporate stock.
51
  In so doing, however, the 
Delaware Supreme Court did not differentiate between the statute’s grant 
of authority for repurchases in general, as opposed to repurchases as a 
defensive tactic.  Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court embraced one key 
aspect of Mr. Lipton’s position by agreeing that a board facing a tender 
offer has a duty to determine whether the offer is in the corporation’s best 
interest: “In that respect a board’s duty is no different from any other 
responsibility it shoulders, and its decisions should be no less entitled to the 
respect they otherwise would be accorded in the realm of business 
judgment.”
52
 
 
 48.  Id. at 555. 
 49.  Id. at 556–57. 
 50.  See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (going beyond the Cheff standard which required that 
directors prove that the tender offer threatened corporate policy); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. 
Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1376 n.17 (Del. 1995) (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (referring to Unocal’s two-part “enhanced business 
judgment rule”).  
 51.  The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal found that the board had statutory 
authority for its conduct under title 8, section 141(a) of the Delaware Code, conferring 
management of the corporation’s ‘business and affairs’ on the board, and under title 8, 
section 160(a) of the Delaware Code, which gives the board authority to deal in its own 
stock.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953–54.  See also Cheff, 199 A.2d at 554 (acknowledging that 
although the Delaware corporate statute gives the corporation the right to repurchase stock, 
the issue at hand was the directors’ motivation for the repurchase). SEC rules subsequently 
invalidated the particular defensive tactic chosen in Unocal.  See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-10, 
240.13e-4(f) (requiring tender offers, including issuer repurchases, to be open equally to all 
holders of a class of securities). 
 52.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Lipton, supra note 30, at 130; see also Unocal, 493 A.2d 
at 954 (“Finally, the board’s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and obligation 
to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably 
perceived, irrespective of its source . . . . Thus, we are satisfied that in the broad context of 
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On the other hand, referring to Cheff and Bennett, the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Unocal then disagreed with Mr. Lipton’s conclusion that 
the business judgment rule should apply, and instead pronounced a critical 
component of its position: “Because of the omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests . . . there is an enhanced duty 
which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections 
of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”
53
  The Supreme Court in 
Unocal held that as is the case in all conflict transactions, the board must 
bear the burden of proof.
54
  In deciding what the board would have to 
prove, the opaque words of the court in Cheff resurfaced; recall that the 
Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff had contended that the board’s conflict 
differed from traditional conflicts, and therefore chose not to apply the 
entire fairness test.
55
  In Unocal, the court of chancery disagreed with this 
aspect of Cheff and held that the board must prove that the chosen 
defensive tactic was fair to the corporation.
56
  While the Delaware Supreme 
Court agreed that “directors are of necessity confronted with a conflict of 
interest,”
57
 it disagreed with the standard of review chosen by the court of 
chancery, namely, the entire fairness test; instead, the Delaware Supreme 
Court cited to and amplified the Cheff test.
58
 
In addition to Cheff’s requirement that the board must prove that the 
takeover was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness,
59
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court in Unocal added a second requirement, namely, that the 
board must prove that the defensive tactic was “reasonable in relation to the 
 
corporate governance, including issues of fundamental corporate change, a board of 
directors is not a passive instrumentality.”) (citation omitted); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 n.10 
(“It has been suggested that a board’s response to a takeover threat should be a passive one.  
However, that clearly is not the law of Delaware . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 53.  Id. at 954.  The court rejected, however, that directors have a conflict of interest 
simply because some board members own stock and would personally benefit from the 
proposed defensive tactic, which was an issuer repurchase at a premium.  Id. at 957-58. 
 54.  Id. at 952, 955 (noting that the chancery court had held that the board bears the 
burden of proof). 
 55.  See supra text accompanying notes 44–47 (cautioning by court in Cheff that its 
decision to shift the burden to directors did not mean that it viewed the conflict at hand 
identically to conflicts directors face when they receive a pecuniary benefit). 
 56.  Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, 1985 WL 44691, at *4 (Del. Ch. 
May 13, 1985), rev’d sub nom., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See generally Bainbridge, supra 
note 9, at 799–800 (commenting on the relationship between Cheff and Unocal). 
 57.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 58.  Id. at 954–55; see Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1320 (articulating what became 
prong one of the Unocal test); see infra text accompanying notes 59-60 (building upon 
Cheff’s requirement that the board prove a danger to corporate policy by adding a second 
requirement, namely that the board must prove their tactic was reasonable in relation to the 
threat posed). 
 59.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
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threat posed.”
60
 This addition subsequently modified the aspect of Unocal 
that required courts to first evaluate whether the tactic is draconian before 
considering whether the tactic is a reasonable response.
61
  If the board 
satisfies Unocal’s requirements, the business judgment rule applies.
62
 
While the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal held that it would apply 
the business judgment rule if the board passed the Unocal test, the court 
subsequently held in Unitrin v. American General Corp. that if the board 
failed Unocal, the board would then have to withstand the entire fairness 
test.
63
  Presumably, the logic of Unitrin is that boards failing Unocal would 
have confirmed their conflict of interest, and, as a result, would now bear 
the burden of convincing the court that their conduct was nevertheless 
entirely fair.  In reality, as it was at the beginning in Unocal, enhanced 
business judgment has remained the entire test.  Of the five cases
64
 post 
Unitrin that failed the Unocal test, Delaware courts mentioned in only one 
that defensive tactics that failed Unocal must then also undergo scrutiny 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1387 (Del. 1995) (“An 
examination of the cases applying Unocal reveals a direct correlation between findings of 
proportionality or disproportionality and the judicial determination of whether a defensive 
response was draconian because it was either coercive or preclusive in character.”).  See 
also In re MONY Grp. S’holder Litig, 853 A.2d 661, 678 (Del. Ch. 2004) (explaining that 
“[t]he Unocal standard, as interpreted by Unitrin . . . first requires the court to determine if a 
defensive measure is preclusive or coercive.  If so, it will be deemed draconian, and not 
protected by the presumptions of the business judgment rule.  If it is not draconian, the 
defensive measure must be within a range of reasonableness, or proportional to an identified 
threat.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 62.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.  The court held that once the board passes the two 
Unocal requirements, then the business judgment rule applies unless the plaintiff shows, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, “that the directors’ decisions were primarily based on 
perpetuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, 
overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uniformed . . . .”  Id.  Despite these options, it is 
virtually impossible for a plaintiff to satisfy any of these additional arguments.  Jennifer J. 
Johnson & Mary Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 
U. PA. L. REV. 315, 327 (1987). 
 63.  Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1377 n.18 (“We note that the directors’ failure to carry their 
initial burden under Unocal does not, ipso facto, invalidate the board’s actions.  Instead, 
once the Court of Chancery finds the business judgment rule does not apply, the burden 
remains on the directors to prove ‘entire fairness.’”).  
 64.  Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 936 (Del. 2003); eBay 
Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 35-36 (Del. Ch. 2010); Aquila, Inc. v. 
Quanta Servs., Inc., 805 A.2d 196, 209 (Del. Ch. 2002); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 
A.2d 293, 317 (Del. Ch. 2000); Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 
A.2d 25, 51-52 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 
A.2d 1281, 1292-93 (Del. 1998); cf. MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 
1118 (Del. 2003) (applying the Blasius test as a necessary component within the Unocal test 
and holding that board’s failure of the Blasius test also constituted a failure of the Unocal 
test). 
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under the entire fairness test.
65
  Courts in the other four cases that held that 
the defensive tactics failed Unocal simply proceeded to grant relief without 
any application of the entire fairness test.
66
  The courts’ disregard of the 
entire fairness test makes sense, however, because defendants cannot hope 
to prove their defensive tactic is fair after a court determines either under 
the first prong of Unocal that there was no threat to the corporation or 
under the second prong that the board’s reaction was draconian or 
unreasonable. Phrased differently, having failed the weaker test of 
reasonableness, target directors cannot realistically hope to pass the more 
stringent test of fairness. 
C. How Enhanced Is Enhanced Review? 
Before launching into what commentators and judges thought Unocal 
said, it is helpful to look carefully at the decision itself.  Four aspects of 
Unocal indicate that despite the connotation behind “enhanced review,” the 
court desired to limit its own involvement in reviewing board conduct.  
One was the court’s refusal to employ the entire fairness test despite noting 
the directors’ inherent conflict of interest.
67
  The second related point is that 
instead of the searching inquiry entire fairness involves, the court clearly 
stated that the benchmark of its review would be a “reasonableness” 
review: did the board demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe there was 
a threat to corporate policy, did the directors show that they had conducted 
a reasonable investigation, and was their response reasonable in relation to 
 
 65.  Chesapeake Corp., 771 A.2d at 317 n.32 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that if defendants 
fail the Unocal test, they must prove their defensive tactics are entirely fair). 
 66.  See Omnicare, Inc., 818 A.2d at 935–36 (finding the deal-protection devices 
violated Unocal because the devices were both preclusive and coercive); eBay Domestic 
Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 34–35 (granting relief after finding that the board’s decision to 
adopt a shareholder rights plan failed both prongs of the Unocal test without applying an 
entire fairness test); Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d at 1131–32 (finding for the plaintiff and 
remanding to Court of Chancery after applying the Blasius “compelling justification” 
standard within the Unocal reasonableness analysis and finding that the directors failed to 
demonstrate a compelling justification for its decision to expand the board from five to 
seven members); Aquila, Inc., 805 A.2d at 208 (finding that defendants could not meet their 
initial burden under Unocal because the defensive tactics they employed were not 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed to the corporation but denying plaintiffs 
preliminary injunction motion on other grounds); Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 721 A.2d at 
1291–93 (affirming the chancery court’s decision that the defendant’s deferred redemption 
plan was unenforceable on the alternative grounds that the plan “impermissibly 
circumscribe[d]” the board’s power under § 141(a)). 
 67.  See supra note 26 (explaining that entire fairness review is searching and requires 
heavy judicial involvement); see supra text at notes 57-58 (refusing to apply the entire 
fairness test as the chancery court had done).  
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the threat posed.
68
  Third, the court indicated that it would afford substantial 
deference to independent directors,
69
 thereby indicating that it was not 
looking to review business decisions carefully.  The final aspect was its 
reasoning that the shareholder vote, not the court, should provide the 
ultimate monitor of board conduct: “If the stockholders are displeased with 
the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate 
democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”
70
  The court’s 
admonition that shareholders are the final arbiter of their board’s conduct 
implied that the court believed most defensive tactics would not constitute 
a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties; thus, if shareholders objected to 
defensive tactics, they would have to vote for different directors.  In sum, 
the court’s refusal to adopt entire fairness review, its emphasis on 
reasonableness, its stated deference to independent directors, and its 
admonition that shareholders ultimately possess the tools to reign in their 
directors all convey that the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal was not 
looking to provide a level of review that required heavy judicial 
involvement. 
In addition, the court’s choice of language in Unocal strongly suggests 
that it intended for its review to provide the board substantial latitude, 
rather than substantial judicial review.  At the outset, “enhanced business 
judgment” creates an association to the deference that is the hallmark of the 
business judgment rule.  Although some would disagree with Professor 
Velasco’s conclusion about whether deference was a fatal flaw in the new 
standard of review, his observation that deference linked enhanced business 
judgment to the business judgment rule is apt: “By tying the test so closely 
to the business judgment rule, the court doomed Unocal to be of limited 
significance . . . . [T]he deference of the business judgment rule . . . was the 
downfall of the Unocal standard.”
71
  The Delaware Supreme Court’s other 
 
 68.  Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385–86 (“[A] court applying enhanced judicial scrutiny 
should be deciding whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect 
decision. . . .  Thus, courts . . . will determine if the directors’ decision was, on balance, 
within a range of reasonableness.”) (emphasis omitted); see Palm & Kearney, supra note 27, 
at 1051 (reasoning that Unocal required the board to show their tactics were reasonable). 
 69.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) 
(“Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval of a board 
comprised of a majority of outside independent directors who have acted in accordance with 
the foregoing standards.”). 
 70.  Id. at 959.  Thus, Delaware courts have committed to ensuring that defensive 
tactics do not preclude the shareholder vote.  See Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1385 (remanding to 
the chancery court to determine whether the defendant board took unreasonable steps to 
preclude the shareholder franchise); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and 
Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 33 (2002) (commenting on 
the value that Delaware places on shareholder voting).   
 71.  Velasco, supra note 10, at 884. 
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word choices, such as its directive that boards could not use “draconian” 
tactics,
72
 put the vast array of non-draconian defensive tactics in play, 
limited thereafter only by whether the tactic was within the range of 
reasonable responses.
73
  Similarly, adding a “further caveat that inequitable 
action may not be taken under the guise of law”
74
 reinforced that the court 
would not tolerate defensive tactics whose function was solely to 
perpetuate the directors in office;
75
 other defensive tactics, within a wide 
range of what is considered “reasonable,” however, would be acceptable.  
Thus, by using highly-charged words like “inequitable” and “draconian,” 
the court identified that the line of impermissible tactics would be quite 
distant.  In essence, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal did not intend 
for the new standard to be half-way between business judgment and entire 
fairness review.  It is telling that the words “intermediate review,” or 
anything similar, are simply not found anywhere in Unocal.  In fact, one 
year after the Delaware Supreme Court decided Unocal, its court of 
chancery was the first to label Unocal review as an “intermediate form of 
judicial review;”
76
 the Delaware Supreme Court did not itself label 
enhanced review as intermediate until eleven years after it decided 
Unocal.
77
 
Regardless of the level of scrutiny the court thought it had created in 
this new standard of review, commentators and jurists had different views 
of the extent and rigor of Unocal review.  Some commentators concluded 
that Unocal’s enhanced review had achieved a correct balance of 
competing interests
78
 but conceded that this review was not rigorous.
79
  In 
 
 72.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 73.  Cf. Velasco, supra note 10, at 848 (contending that non-draconian responses are 
likely reasonable); see also infra discussion Part III.A (proposing a reformulation of 
enhanced business judgment). 
 74.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 
1986); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 800 (viewing enhanced review as lying between the 
duties of care and loyalty, rather than between the business judgment rule and entire 
fairness). 
 77.  Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1377 n.18 (Del. 1996) (reasoning that Unocal 
jurisprudence requires the board’s actions to “pass an intermediate level of enhanced 
judicial scrutiny” before the business judgment rule can apply). 
 78.  Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1319 (“Unocal’s original rationale for crating the 
intermediate standard of review was sound.  That intermediate standard operates at the 
intersection between the directors’ authority to manage the corporation and the 
stockholders’ rights and powers as owners of property.  Where directors take actions that 
impede the ability of the owners of the enterprise to sell their shares or elect a new board of 
directors . . . it [is] appropriate to employ a more searching and flexible form of judicial 
review to assess the validity of the board’s action.”); Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 862–63 
(“The board has legitimate authority in the takeover context, just as it has in proxy contests 
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contrast to commentators who argued that Unocal review was in need of 
sharper teeth to better protect shareholders, these commentators viewed the 
mild nature of Unocal review as appropriate because it afforded directors 
the deference necessary to effectively operate a company.
80
  Only a few 
who hailed Unocal review for simultaneously allowing boards leeway to 
act subject to some judicial review thought that review was intermediate;
81
 
however, some of these commentators have questioned whether Unocal 
review actually continues to be an intermediate level of scrutiny after 
several subsequent decisions arguably diluted Unocal review.
82
 
In contrast, the Unocal doctrine disappointed others who contended 
that enhanced business judgment review provided insufficient monitoring 
because the review was more form than substance:  although the board now 
bore the burden of proof, what it had to prove was easily satisfied.
83
  This 
 
and a host of other decisions that nominally appear to belong to the shareholders. . . .  
Therefore, authority cannot be avoided anymore than accountability; the task is to come up 
with a reasonable balance. Properly interpreted, that is precisely what the Delaware cases 
have done.”). 
 79.  Professor Bainbridge concluded his article by arguing that the Delaware courts 
have settled on a “reasonable balance” between authority and accountability with the 
Unocal standard of review.  See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 862–63; Bainbridge, supra 
note 9, at 800 (“[T]he Unocal test is more properly seen as a conditional version of the 
business judgment rule, rather than an intermediate standard of review lying between the 
duties of care and of loyalty.”). 
 80.  Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 800. 
 81.  See Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1319 (“Unocal’s original rationale for creating 
the intermediate standard of review was sound. . . .  Where directors take actions that 
impede the ability of the owners of the enterprise to sell their shares or elect a new board of 
directors . . . it [is] appropriate to employ a more searching and flexible form of judicial 
review to assess the validity of the board’s action.”); Bradley R. Aronstam, The Interplay of 
Blasius and Unocal—A Compelling Problem Justifying the Call for Substantial Change, 81 
OR. L. REV. 429, 470-71 (2002) (arguing that enhanced business judgment is an 
intermediate standard of review); Terry M. Hackett, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. 
Time Inc.: Taking the Teeth Out of Proportionality Review, 22 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 229, 243 
(1990) (noting that “the [Unocal] standard is truly intermediate and provides an effective 
way for the court to distinguish takeover defenses that are beneficial to shareholders from 
those designed to entrench incumbent management” but arguing that the court’s decision in 
Paramount weakened Unocal). 
 82.  See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1315-16 n.111 (explaining that the court 
diluted the Unocal test when it held in Paramount that a board may defend against 
shareholders’ opposing an unsolicited bid); Aronstam, supra note 81, at 470 (asserting the 
Delaware Supreme Court diluted the effectiveness of Unocal review).  See infra text 
accompanying notes 177-196 (discussing the cases that have arguably diluted Unocal, 
namely, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) and 
Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995)).   
 83.  See Johnson & Siegel, supra note 62, at 338 (arguing that “Unocal’s loyalty tests 
are superficial.  The only substantive aspect of the Unocal test is that the directors fulfill 
their duty of care, and that standard is easily met . . . .”); see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, The 
Life and Adventures of Unocal - Part I: Moore the Marrier, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 85, 89, 143 
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argument was based on the logic that since virtually all tender offers seek 
to change corporate policy, Unocal’s first step was easily met, and 
Unocal’s second step requiring a reasonable response would weed out only 
the most extreme defensive tactics.  Phrased differently, Unocal allows the 
vast majority of defensive tactics to be implemented.
84
  Furthermore, some 
commentators reasoned that two additional aspects of Unocal further 
diluted enhanced business judgment’s already weak prongs.  One was the 
court’s proffer of deference to decisions made by a board consisting of a 
majority of independent directors;
85
 to no one’s surprise, boards changed 
their composition to earn this deference even before federal law and stock 
exchanges mandated that a majority of boards of public corporations 
consist of a majority of independent directors.
86
  The second was the 
court’s statement that in satisfying each step, the board could consider the 
interests of constituencies other than shareholders.
87
  For example, 
permitting the board to consider the interests of non-shareholder 
constituencies freed the directors to consider whether a bidder’s plans 
included firing corporate employees.
88
  In so doing, the court fortified the 
 
(1998) (noting that Unocal placed the burden of proof on the board, and concluding that, 
over time, the Unocal test was created, debated, and turned into the equivalent of the 
business judgment rule); Scott P. Towers, Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. - The 
Unocal Standard: More Bark Than Bite?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 485 (1990) (“[W]hile the 
Delaware Supreme Court may have altered its standard for reviewing directors’ actions in 
response to takeover attempts, the alteration detracts little, if any, from the protections of the 
business judgment rule.”). 
 84.  Johnson & Siegel, supra note 62, at 338 (arguing that most defensive tactics will 
pass Unocal’s standard of review). 
 85.  Unocal, 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 86.  STANDARDS RELATING TO LISTED COMPANY AUDIT COMMITTEES, EXCHANGE ACT 
(as added by Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301) Release Nos. 33-8220, 34-47654, 68 Fed. 
Reg. 18,788 (Apr. 16, 2003), available at http:// www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm; 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, NASD AND NYSE RULEMAKING: RELATING TO 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 2003) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm#P58_18388 (approving New York Stock 
Exchange and Nasdaq listing requirements that require the board of directors of each listed 
company to consist of a majority of independent directors).  Of the thirty-seven cases that 
have passed Unocal, thirty-one had boards with a majority of independent directors, two did 
not, and courts in four cases did not provide this information.  Siegel, supra note 13, at 621. 
 87.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (noting that in evaluating a reasonable response to the 
threat, the board may consider the bid’s “effect on the corporate enterprise” and that 
“[e]xamples of such concerns may include . . . the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than the 
shareholders”).  Revlon subsequently modified this requirement.  See infra note 89 and 
accompanying text.  
 88.  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.  By so holding, the court made it easier for the target 
board to satisfy step one, because hostile offers often are a threat to target employees who 
may lose their jobs if the offeror succeeds and restructures the target.  See DOOLEY, supra 
note 33 (explaining that interests of other constituencies may align more with management 
than with shareholders); Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 773 n.23.  Directors also benefit in step 
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board’s success rate in identifying a threat as well as the range of 
reasonable responses to that threat.  Subsequently, the Delaware Supreme 
Court reformulated the board’s ability to consider non-shareholder 
constituencies by adding that target directors could consider these 
constituencies only if there are “rationally-related benefits accruing to the 
stockholders.”
89
  The court’s reformulation, however, only alerted boards to 
the court’s view that all constituencies did not have equal priorities. 
This perspective of a fairly passive Unocal review is borne out by 
statistics.  Cases subsequent to Unocal have proven Unocal’s critics to be 
largely correct in their claim that Unocal review is fairly benign.  The 
criticism that Unocal’s first requirement was toothless and would be easily 
met is proven by the fact that in Unocal’s twenty-seven year history, only 
one case has failed this first prong and that was because the court found 
that the board’s stated policy was invalid;
90
 as such, the court did not have 
to reach the issue of whether the board had properly identified a threat.  
Moreover, although whoever has the burden of proof is supposed to be 
more likely to lose its case,
91
 defendant directors have passed the enhanced 
business judgment test in seventy-nine percent of Unocal cases.
92
  Nothing 
 
two from the ability to consider other constituencies because more tactics will be deemed 
reasonable to protect the broader base of constituencies.  Id.   
 89.  Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986).  Revlon further held that when a board is in a Revlon mode, rather than in a Unocal 
mode, the board may not consider the interests of non-shareholder constituencies.  Id.  
Contra IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (2009) (allowing board to consider interests of non-
shareholder constituencies in all transactions). 
 90.  Siegel, supra note 13, at 620 (identifying eBay as the only case to fail Unocal’s 
first prong); eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(“Thus, I cannot accept as valid for the purposes of implementing the Rights Plan a 
corporate policy that specifically, clearly, and admittedly seeks not to maximize the 
economic value of a for-profit Delaware corporation for the benefit of its 
stockholders . . . .”). 
 91.  See, e.g., Stephen Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the 
Cleanup of Hazardous Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197, 277 (1988) (contending that 
“[w]hichever side . . . ultimately inherits the final burden of proof is likely to lose in any 
legal confrontation”); Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical Study of the Change 
in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 PITT. TAX REV. 61, 66 (2008) (“If 
all things are equal in a case, the party who would win is the one who does not have the 
burden of proof.”); David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 MO. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2004) (“[T]he legal endgame is to place the burden of proof on the other side.  Whoever 
has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose.”). 
 92.  For a list of cases that failed Unocal, see Siegel, supra note 13, at 619–21 n.96.  
See also Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2013) (finding 
directors failed Unocal by refusing to consider a slate of new directors and falsely informing 
shareholders that the election of the rival board would trigger a “Proxy Put” provision 
forcing the company to repurchase $4.3 billion of debt).  Similarly, the Delaware Supreme 
Court extended enhanced business judgment review to Revlon decisions, where defendants 
enjoy an identical 79% success rate as well; see infra Part II.B (discussing the Delaware 
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can explain this simultaneous high success rate and shouldering the burden 
of proof other than acknowledging that what defendants have to prove 
under this standard of review is not difficult.  As such, labeling the Unocal 
test as an intermediate standard of review must be understood as meaning 
only that this test is not quite as deferential as is the business judgment 
rule; enhanced business judgment simply cannot be understood as 
approaching any intermediate or half-way mark between the business 
judgment rule and entire fairness.
93
  Thus, one must embrace cautiously 
statements like the one the chancery court articulated in In re Dollar Thrifty 
describing enhanced business judgment as being “[i]n that middle ground, 
the reviewing court has leeway to examine the reasonableness of the 
board’s actions under a standard that is more stringent than business 
judgment review and yet less severe than the entire fairness standard.”
94
  
Other jurists agree that Unocal review has little bite.  Chief Justice 
Strine, in both his earlier scholarly writing and in some of his cases, has 
acknowledged that enhanced business judgment has fallen short.  For 
example, in Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc.,
95
 then Vice-Chancellor 
Strine stated, “I recognize . . . that some of the prior Unocal case law gave 
reason to fear that that standard, and the related Revlon standard, were 
being denuded into simply another name for business judgment rule 
review.”
96
  Additionally, Chancellor Strine and several other judges wrote 
an article in which they conceded that “Unocal, with its enhanced business 
judgment language proved to be rather management friendly . . . .”
97
 
Another jurist, Chancellor Chandler, has a slightly different view:  he 
contends that Unocal was, at its origins, more of a meaningful standard of 
review, but subsequent Delaware Supreme Court decisions diluted that 
review to its current anemic state.  In Air Products and Chemicals v. 
Airgas, Inc.,
98
 Chancellor Chandler regarded two Delaware Supreme Court 
decisions, Paramount Communications v. Time,
99
 and Unitrin, Inc. v. 
 
Supreme Court’s Revlon decision).  
 93.  See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990) (“Unocal 
establishes an intermediate form of judicial review that when applicable introduces into 
business judgment discourse elements of the fiduciary duty analysis); see also Bainbridge, 
supra note 9, at 800 (arguing that the Unocal standard is not truly intermediate, but rather “a 
conditional version of the business judgment rule”); Kristin A. Linsley, Statutory 
Limitations on Directors’ Liability in Delaware: A New Look at Conflicts of Interest and the 
Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 545 (1987) (describing the Unocal 
standard as a “modified business judgment analysis”). 
 94.  In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 598 (Del. Ch. 2010).  
 95.  929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 96.  Id. at 810. (footnote omitted) 
 97.  Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1315. (footnote omitted) 
 98.  16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).  
 99.  571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
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American General Corp.,
100
 as game-changers because, among other 
controversial aspects of those cases,
101
 the Delaware Supreme Court 
criticized in dictum the strong Unocal review performed by the respective 
chancery court judges.
102
  Thus, in Air Products, Chancellor Chandler 
lamented the dilution of Unocal review, and held that Unitrin and 
Paramount compelled him to permit the target board to keep its poison pill 
in place, despite his personal view that the pill served no further role in the 
facts before him.
103
 
Whether Chancellor Chandler is correct that Unocal originally was 
truly intermediate review that subsequent Delaware Supreme Court 
decisions have weakened,
104
 or whether, as argued above,
105
 the Delaware 
Supreme Court never intended enhanced review to provide strong 
intermediate review, is now academic.
106
  Instead, enhanced business 
judgment allows the board to act within extremely broad parameters.  
Rather than engaging in searching scrutiny of the board’s conduct, the 
court has instead chosen to play border guard.  The court uses enhanced 
business judgment only to ensure that directors neither act unreasonably
107
 
nor preclude the shareholder vote so that shareholders have the option to 
 
 100.  651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 101.  See infra Part III.A (discussing controversial aspects of Time and Unitrin and their 
impact on enhanced business judgment review). 
 102.  See Unitrin Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d at 1361, 1389–90 (Del. 1995) 
(chiding the chancery court for determining that a defensive tactic was unnecessary, a 
determination that belongs to directors, not to the court); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) (noting that to the extent the chancery court in 
recent decisions substituted its judgment for that of the board, such substitutions would be 
inconsistent with Unocal). 
 103.  In Air Products, Chancellor Chandler reluctantly held that the Delaware Supreme 
Court permits corporations to keep poison pills in place indefinitely, even though 
Chancellor Chandler contended that Airgas’ poison pill had already served its purpose of 
generating a higher bid from the offeror and time to communicate its views to its 
shareholders.  Air Prods. & Chems. v. Airgas Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57–58 (Del. Ch. 2011).  
 104.  Chancellor Chandler’s view that Unocal originally provided intermediate review 
stems not from Unocal itself, but instead from Moran v. Household International, Inc., 
which allowed corporations to adopt a poison pill but cautioned that the pill could not stay 
in place forever.  Id. at 95-96. 
 105.  Supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. 
 106.  See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Unocal Revisited: No Tiger in the Tank, 27 J. CORP. 
L. 1, 2 (2001) (“Delaware jurisprudence since Unocal reveals that, despite the promise 
articulated in that case . . . the Delaware Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with 
board decisions . . . .”); Velasco, supra note 10, at 847 (contending that “the enhanced 
scrutiny standard sound[s] strikingly similar to the business judgment rule”); id. at 884 
(“Unocal . . . sounded promising at first and later proved to be relatively ineffectual.”). 
 107.  Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings, Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *11 
(Del. Ch. 2013) (“Enhanced scrutiny . . . is a test of reasonableness . . . .”) (citing In re 
Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595-96 (Del. Ch. 2010)). 
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vote out of office the directors who engage in defensive tactics.
108
  Given 
that Delaware courts have always protected the shareholder vote,
109
 
shareholders gained little ground in that aspect of enhanced review.
110
 
These observations bring us full circle.  The Delaware Supreme 
Court’s concession in both Cheff and Unocal that target directors face some 
type of conflict of interest eliminated the business judgment rule as a 
credible standard of review.  The court, however, neither applied the entire 
fairness test nor explained why it bypassed that test.  The import of these 
decisions is significant: Unocal’s creation of the enhanced business 
judgment standard of review gave the court the freedom it lacked under the 
business judgment rule to review the reasonableness of the board’s reaction 
to a hostile offer, while not requiring the court to determine if the board’s 
reaction is entirely fair.
111
  Part II of this Article examines the issue the 
court left unspoken in Cheff and Unocal:  the nature of the conflict that 
caused the court to eschew both the business judgment standard and the 
entire fairness standard.  Part II will also consider whether the courts’ 
extension of enhanced business judgment to Revlon and a voting case is 
consistent with that conflict. 
II. ENHANCED BUSINESS JUDGMENT: THE UNDERBELLY AND ITS 
TENTACLES 
A. The Underbelly: What Kind of Conflict Is Enhanced Business 
Judgment Designed to Monitor? 
As discussed above,
112
 the Delaware Supreme Court faced competing 
views on how to deal with directors’ desire to enact defensive tactics.  
Those favoring giving directors nearly unfettered discretion argued that the 
 
 108.  See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (“If the 
stockholders are displeased with the action of their elected representatives, the powers of 
corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board out.”). 
 109.  MM Companies, Inc., v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) 
(characterizing the shareholder franchise as “the ‘ideological underpinning’ upon which the 
legitimacy of directors managerial power rests.”) (footnote omitted); Carmody v. Toll Bros., 
Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1193 (Del. Ch. 1998) (citing the “primacy of the shareholder vote” in 
Delaware’s system of corporate governance); Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 
659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (describing the shareholder vote as of “central importance . . . to the 
scheme of corporate governance. . . .”). 
 110.  See Paul L. Regan, What’s Left of Unocal?, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 970 (2001) 
(arguing that Unocal review “has, as a practical matter, been reduced to the . . . task of 
ensuring that the shareholders retain the ability to remove their board of directors through 
the proxy machinery.”). 
 111.  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 277 (3rd ed. 2012). 
 112.  See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
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business judgment rule applied.  Those who believed that directors had an 
inherent conflict of interest claimed (among other arguments) that the 
board should be required to remain passive in the face of a hostile offer, or 
at least should have to prove the entire fairness of any defensive tactic—a 
standard that the board would fail in most cases.  Implicit in these 
competing views lies a further divide: those who favored the business 
judgment rule necessarily believed that directors face no conflict of interest 
in this context,
113
 while those who favored passivity or entire fairness 
believed the board has an inherent conflict of interest.  Seemingly, the 
Delaware Supreme Court chose a path between these views.  As an 
acknowledgment to those who thought there was a conflict of interest, the 
court required the board to bear the burden of proof; as an acknowledgment 
to those who thought the business judgment rule should apply, the court 
imposed only a light burden on the board.  As a result, the court would 
neither defer to the board’s decision nor scrutinize it carefully under the 
enhanced business judgment rule. 
The court’s creation of a middle ground might have been more than 
simply an effort to appease both sides in the debate.  In fact, the court 
would likely have reached its conclusion even without the boundaries being 
so carefully demarcated.  The reason is that enactment of defensive tactics 
itself occupies the middle ground between an obvious conflict—as is the 
case when directors transact business with their corporation—and a 
suspicion that a conflict could exist by virtue of the directors concern about 
losing their jobs should a hostile offer succeed.
114
  As the court in City 
Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc. reasoned, the enactment of defensive 
tactics is “neither self-dealing nor wholly disinterested.”
115
  Instead of 
facing a conflict based on a concrete, financial interest, target directors 
faced a motivational conflict: are directors motivated to act in the 
corporation’s best interest, or are directors instead motivated by preserving 
 
 113.  Cf. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (stating that among other 
requirements for application of the business judgment rule, directors must be disinterested). 
 114.  See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 44, at 1290 (differentiating between “situations 
involving self-dealing . . . by requiring the directors to justify as intrinsically fair any 
transaction in which they had a financial interest [from]. . . cases where the directors have 
no direct pecuniary interest in the transaction but have an ‘entrenchment’ interest, i.e., an 
interest in protecting their existing control of the corporation.”); Judd F. Sneirson, Merger 
Agreements, Termination Fees, and the Contract-Corporate Tension, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 573, 589 (2002) (“Where a board is faced with a bid to take over the company, and 
acts to defend the company against it, circumstances present a conflict of interest, although 
not the sort of conflict of interest implicated in traditional duty of loyalty settings.  Although 
directors may not have a direct personal or pecuniary stake in the decisions they make, they 
naturally have an interest in remaining in control of the company, remaining in office, and 
enjoying the perquisites of office.”) (footnote omitted). 
 115.  551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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their jobs?  Thus, it is necessary to explain what the court did not:  the 
nature of a motivational conflict and how this conflict differs from 
traditional conflicts where a director’s self-interest is pecuniary and 
visible.
116
  This Article uses the term “conflict-lite” synonymously with a 
motivational conflict. 
In Aronson v. Lewis, the Delaware Supreme Court offered two 
definitions of “interested” transactions: one, if directors “appear on both 
sides of a transaction”
117
 or two, if directors “expect to derive any personal 
financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing.”
118
  Since self-dealing 
involves a director standing on both sides of a transaction, these two 
definitions overlap considerably, with the second reinforcing that the 
conflict must be financial in nature.  It is therefore not surprising that one 
aspect of the entire fairness test directly responds to concerns about self-
dealing by requiring the interested directors to show that they dealt fairly.
119
  
Similarly, while the fair dealing component of the entire fairness test could 
easily encompass the element of fair price, the court has reinforced the 
financial aspect of a conflict by making fair price an independent prong of 
the entire fairness test.
120
 
In contrast, a situation such as responding to a hostile tender offer will 
generate a motivational conflict, causing shareholders to question why the 
directors acted as they did.  In a hostile offer context, directors can support, 
remain neutral, or attempt to fend off the offeror.  Those management 
decisions bear directly on whether the directors retain their positions.  
Therefore, a cloud of suspicion envelops the directors’ chosen response to a 
hostile offer. 
While there are myriad reasons that the Delaware Supreme Court 
might shun entire-fairness review of defensive tactics,
121
 if it had wanted to 
 
 116.  See Sneirson, supra note 114, at 589 (describing the conflict of interest target 
directors face in a hostile tender offer). 
 117.  Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (noting that the entire 
fairness test encompasses not just a fair price, but also fair dealing, which “embraces 
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were 
obtained.”). 
 120.  Id. (defining entire fairness as encompassing fair dealing and fair price). 
 121.  Professor Gilson aptly made the point that the entire fairness standard in this 
context would have put the court in a situation that was anathema to the court:  
Applying a fairness standard to this decision, however, requires a court to 
determine whether it was ‘fair’ for control to remain with management rather 
than shift to the offeror.  And this inquiry must necessarily focus on whether the 
shareholders would be better off with existing management or by selling their 
shares. 
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pursue this route doing so would have been pointless.  The entire-fairness 
test is simply inapt because defensive tactics cannot be measured by either 
the fair dealing or the fair price component of this test:  target directors are 
not dealing with the corporation at all,
122
 and securing a fair price for its 
defensive tactic is not the issue.
123
  Thus, the question that needed 
answering—are the directors motivated to act in the best interest of the 
corporation when they enact defensive tactics—is different from traditional 
conflicts not only in degree but also in kind, and, as such, required a new 
paradigm.  As a result, this different type of conflict necessitated different 
monitoring. 
One caveat before moving on to examine the enhanced business 
judgment monitor:  some might question whether this motivational conflict 
is simply the same as structural bias, another concept that intermittently 
surfaces in the Delaware case law.
124
  As Professor Velasco explained: 
 
The term ‘structural bias’ generally refers to the prejudice that 
members of the board of directors may have in favor of one 
another and of management.  It is said to be the result of the 
‘common cultural bond’ and ‘natural empathy and collegiality’ 
shared by most directors, the ‘economic[] or psychological[] 
dependen[cy] upon or tie[s] to the corporation’s executives, 
particularly its chief executive,’ and the ‘process of director 
selection and socialization, which incumbent management 
dominates.’
125
 
 
The two concepts, conflict-lite and structural bias, share a core feature in 
that both constitute a conflict not involving financial self-dealing.  Despite 
this common feature, the two concepts are fundamentally different.  
Structural bias encompasses a variety of reasons that might prejudice 
directors to act in favor of each other, rather than in the best interest of the 
 
Gilson, supra note 32, at 827. 
 122.  Cf. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710 (noting that fair dealing addresses concerns raised 
when directors sit on both sides of a transaction, thus implying that such a test is inapt when 
directors are not on both sides of a transaction).  
 123.  See Gilson, supra note 32, at 827 (explaining that whether a fair price was paid for 
a defensive measure is irrelevant because the potential conflict at interest involves the 
decision to block a change in control, not any decision related to price).  
 124.  The Delaware Supreme Court has raised the issue of structural bias in derivative 
actions. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050-51 (Del. 2004) (discussing structural 
bias including the development of close “personal friendship[s]”); Velasco, supra note 10, at 
821, 849 (reviewing Aronson v. Lewis’ discussion of structural bias and contending that 
Zapata’s recognition of “the realities of [the] situation” of the likely recommendation of a 
board’s special litigation committee are “simply another articulation of structural bias.”). 
 125.  Velasco, supra note 10, at 824 (citations omitted). 
SIEGEL_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:52 PM 
72 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
corporation: 
 
First, structural bias can be understood as a form of implicit 
conspiracy: directors may pursue their group interests 
consciously, even in situations where there is no obvious personal 
benefit.  Second, structural bias may be understood as the effect 
of relationships:  directors may favor friends and colleagues over 
distant shareholders.  Third, structural bias may be understood as 
a psychological phenomenon:  a manifestation of in group bias, 
which may operate on an unconscious level.
126
 
 
In contrast, conflict-lite is limited to a specific economic self-interest where 
directors’ motivation to save their jobs might consciously or unconsciously 
collide with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation 
and its shareholders.
127
 
At least in theory, the Delaware Supreme Court should have designed 
the enhanced business judgment monitor to identify whether target 
directors were acting to protect the corporation or were instead acting to 
protect their jobs in violation of their fiduciary duty of loyalty.
128
  
Unfortunately, neither of Unocal’s two prongs elicits the directors’ motive.  
The shareholders’ claim that the board violated its duty of loyalty by acting 
to protect the board members’ jobs generated only an inferential response: 
if there is a threat to corporate policy as Unocal’s first prong requires, the 
court will assume that threat, rather than directors seeking to protect their 
own jobs, must be the reason the board enacted defensive tactics.  If 
Unocal’s critics are right that directors can always find a threat to corporate 
policy,
129
 this inference is hollow.  As noted above,
130
 Unocal’s long history 
reinforces this criticism.  Only one case has ever failed Unocal’s first 
 
 126.  Id. at 855.   
 127.  Cf. Id. at 846–47 (claiming Unocal’s “omnipresent specter” is simply another name 
for structural bias, and amplifying that “[a]lthough the court did not see the [Unocal] case as 
involving self-dealing, it understood that directors were conflicted.  This is the essential 
claim of structural bias.”).   
 128.  See Leo E. Strine, Jr. et. al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good 
Faith in Corporation Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 629, 671 (2010) (stating that the Unocal test is 
about discerning the board’s motives).  But see Steven G. Bradbury, Corporate Auctions 
and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: A Third-Generation Business Judgment Rule, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 276, 301 (1988) (stating that Unocal disregards the board’s subjective motives and 
looks only at the tactics themselves). 
 129.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text (stating that only one case had ever 
failed to prove the tender offer was a threat to corporate policy, and that was only because 
the corporation tried to protect an invalid policy). 
 130.  See supra note 90 and accompanying text (explaining that only one case has failed 
the first prong of Unocal). 
SIEGEL_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:52 PM 
2014] PROBLEMS AND PROMISE  73 
 
prong,
131
 and that failure occurred because the board’s policy was 
invalid,
132
 not because there was no danger.  Little need be said about the 
viability of a test that one party passes virtually 100% of the time.  Perhaps 
the ineffectiveness of Unocal’s first prong was inevitable, as the courts’ 
prior attempts to discern a board’s “true” motive in other contexts have 
been similarly ineffective.
133
 
If the search for a board’s true motive is merely a quixotic inquiry, 
and if target directors can always show a threat to corporate policy, one 
must hunt further to find a function for Unocal’s first prong.  Prong one 
seems to function solely to tee up the court’s concern about the board’s 
motivation.  This concern thereafter provides the justification for the court, 
in prong two, to examine the board’s decision, rather than defer to the 
directors’ business judgment. 
As such, the heart of enhanced business judgment is its second prong.  
Having stated that the board has an inherent conflict that makes evaluation 
under the business judgment rule inapt, the court chose to evaluate whether 
the board’s response was within a range of reasonableness.  The logic 
behind this prong is that the court would not have to isolate whether and to 
what extent the board’s conflict impacted on the decision as long as there 
was another plausible scenario:  a threat to the corporate policy existed 
(prong one) and the board responded reasonably to that threat (prong two).  
Viewed another way, Unocal’s second prong enabled the court to evaluate 
whether or not target directors were inflicting harm on the corporation, 
 
 131.  eBay Domestic Holdings, v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 132.  Id. at 34-35 (ruling that Craigslist’s policy designed to aid communities by 
providing free classified ads is “devoid of monetized elements” and therefore was an invalid 
corporate policy for a for-profit corporation).  
 133.  See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 721-22 (Del. 1971) 
(examining the board’s motive for declaring dividends by asking the futile question of 
whether all shareholders got their pro rata share); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
No. 10389 1989 WL 7036, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (examining the board’s 
motivation to grant the winning bid to an outside bidder rather than management’s bid by 
looking at the reasonableness of the board’s decision); see also, Bernard Black & Reinieer 
Kraakman, Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 521, 565 (2002) (positing that the court should look at the effect of the board’s 
actions because of the difficulty of determining the directors’ primary motive); cf. Joshua L. 
Vineyard, Let (Corporate) Freedom Ring: Reaffirming the Importance of the Shareholder 
Franchise in State of Wisconsin Investment Board v. Peerless Systems Corporation, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1443, 1465–66 (2003) (noting that requiring courts to identify a board’s 
primary purpose is one of the reasons the Blasius test has been invoked infrequently).  But 
cf. Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 807 (Del. Ch. 2007) (describing the 
Unocal test and concluding, “[b]ecause there is a burden on the party in power to identify its 
legitimate objectives and to explain its actions as necessary to advance those objections, 
flimsy pretense stands a greater chance of being revealed.”). 
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regardless of their motives.
134
  While target shareholders may object to 
allowing directors’ motives to be self-serving as long as the board selects a 
reasonable defensive tactic, the Delaware Supreme Court evaluated what it 
could: tangible harm to the corporation.  Subsequently, the court made this 
same tradeoff—abandoning the elusive search for motive and instead 
evaluating tangible harm to the corporation—when it applied enhanced 
business judgment in Revlon.
135
 
In sum, the Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff explained its theory of 
director conflicts by a negative example, reasoning that its decision to shift 
the burden did not indicate that “the directors have the same ‘self-dealing 
interest’ as is present, for example, when a director sells his property to the 
corporation.”
136
  This negative explanation left future courts to guess at the 
difference between traditional conflicts and defensive tactic conflicts.  This 
Article has now isolated what the court did not: the Unocal conflict is one 
of motive.  Since identifying an inherently conflicted motive is challenging, 
Unocal’s second prong elevates the court’s evaluation of whether the 
board’s response was reasonable to the test’s defining point. 
B. The Reach of the Tentacles—So Far 
Thus far, the Delaware Supreme Court has extended enhanced 
business judgment only to the Revlon context.
137
  In addition, one court of 
 
 134.  BAINBRIDGE, supra note 111, at 277 (noting that the directors’ motive is really 
irrelevant; as long as the directors did not cause harm to the corporation, the court acted 
under the “no harm no foul theory”). 
 135.  See infra Part II.B (discussing the Delaware Supreme Court’s Revlon decision). 
 136.  Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964). 
 137.  Delaware courts have thus far stated that only a few fact patterns will put a 
corporation in a “Revlon mode.”  In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 71 
(Del. 1995) (listing the following transactions that will put the corporation in a Revlon 
mode: “(1) when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to 
effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company; (2) where, in 
response to a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative 
transaction involving the break-up of the company; or (3) when approval of a transaction 
results in a sale or change of control”) (quoting Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 
A.2d 1270, 1290 (Del. 1994)) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Mills 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989) (applying enhanced 
business judgment when the corporation is in a Revlon mode).  Since the Delaware Supreme 
Court has yet to draw a clear line for when Revlon review would apply to a mixed cash and 
stock transaction, Delaware courts are working their way through these fact patterns.  See 
Id. at 70–71 (holding that 33% cash did not trigger Revlon duties); In re Smurfit-Stone, No. 
6164-VCP, 2011 Del Ch. LEXIS 79, at *60 (May 20, 2011) (holding that a merger in which 
target shareholders would receive half cash, half stock, and ownership of 45% of the 
combined company, is in a Revlon mode); In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 
732 n.25 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) 
(suggesting that a merger that provided 62% of the consideration to target shareholders in 
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chancery has suggested replacing the Blasius standard of review with 
enhanced business judgment.
138
  These extensions of enhanced business 
judgment review show that Delaware courts have perceived a need for an 
enhanced standard of review outside of Unocal fact pattern.  Courts have, 
however, not provided straightforward explanations for their rationale for 
these extensions, nor have courts discussed whether these extensions 
present conflict-lite issues. 
1. Revlon Transactions 
Although the Delaware Supreme Court created enhanced business 
judgment in Unocal to monitor the directors’ inherent conflict of interest 
when they are faced with a hostile tender offer, the court seamlessly 
decided to apply enhanced business judgment when directors are instead 
faced with a Revlon decision.  Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc.
139
 
was the first case in which the Delaware Supreme Court held that it will 
subject the board’s conduct to enhanced scrutiny when the corporation is in 
a Revlon mode.
140
  The Delaware Supreme Court’s discussion of enhanced 
business judgment in Mills focused only on those Revlon situations where 
the target faces more than one bidder and qualified the application of 
enhanced business judgment on a plaintiff’s prior demonstration that the 
target directors did not treat all bidders equally: 
 
[W]hen management of a target company determines that the 
company is for sale, the board’s responsibilities under the 
enhanced Unocal standards are significantly altered.  Although 
the board’s responsibilities under Unocal are far different, the 
enhanced duties of the directors in responding to a potential shift 
in control, recognized in Unocal, remain unchanged.  This 
principle pervades Revlon, and when directors conclude that an 
auction is appropriate, the standard by which their ensuing 
actions will be judged continues to be the enhanced duty imposed 
 
cash would be in a Revlon mode).  Cf. In re Synthes, Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 
1047–48 (Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that no change of control occurred so as to trip Revlon 
duties where 65% of the purchase price was paid with the purchaser’s publicly-traded stock, 
making it impossible for the purchaser to be a controlling shareholder); In re NYMEX 
S’holder Litig., Nos. 3621-VCN, 3835-VCN, 2009 WL 3206051, at *5–7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
30, 2009) (dismissing shareholder challenge to merger and finding transaction adequate that 
offered shareholders 36% cash at the time of the merger, and 44% cash at the closing of the 
merger, but declining to rule squarely on whether the corporation was in a Revlon mode). 
 138.  Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810, 818. 
 139.  559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). 
 140.  Id. at 1287. 
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by this Court in Unocal. 
. . . .  
When Revlon duties devolve upon directors, this Court will 
continue to exact an enhanced judicial scrutiny at the 
threshold. . . . 
At the outset, the plaintiff must show, and the trial court 
must find, that the directors of the target company treated one or 
more of the respective bidders on unequal terms.  It is only then 
that the two-part threshold requirement of Unocal is truly 
invoked, for in Revlon, we held that . . . ‘the directors cannot 
fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with the 
contending factions.’
141
 
 
Some nine years after it decided Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court, 
in Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., offered both a 
summary of enhanced review in the Revlon context that is not limited to 
auction scenarios and one that is.  In its general description of how the 
components of enhanced business judgment operate in a Revlon context, 
the court stated: 
 
The key features of an enhanced judicial scrutiny test are: (a) a 
judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the 
decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including the 
information on which the directors based their decision; and (b) a 
judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors’ action 
in light of the circumstances then existing.  The directors have the 
burden of proving that they were adequately informed and acted 
reasonably.
142
 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court then explained why Revlon contexts 
require enhanced business judgment, at least in the factual scenario before 
the court: 
 
Board action in the circumstances presented here is subject to 
enhanced scrutiny. Such scrutiny is mandated by: (a) the 
threatened diminution of the current stockholders’ voting power; 
(b) the fact that an asset belonging to public stockholders (a 
control premium) is being sold and may never be available again; 
and (c) the traditional concern of Delaware courts for actions 
 
 141.  Id. at 1287–88 (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 
A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986)) (emphasis in original).  
 142.  Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994). 
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which impair or impede stockholder voting rights.
143
 
 
Contrary to the court’s statement, however, these facts only explain why 
the corporation is in a Revlon mode; they do not provide the basis for 
enhanced scrutiny. 
The Delaware courts of chancery have offered some thoughtful 
explanations of why Revlon contexts require enhanced business judgment.  
One of the most helpful explanations was provided in In re Dollar Thrifty 
Shareholder Litigation,
144
 where the court noted that when a change in 
corporate control occurs, “there is the danger that top corporate managers 
will resist a sale that might cost them their managerial posts, or prefer a 
sale to one industry rival rather than another for reasons having more to do 
with personal ego than with what is best for stockholders.”
145
  The court 
further explained its reason for applying enhanced business judgment in the 
Revlon context: 
 
One of the benefits of this approach is that it mandates that the 
court look closely at the motivations of the board.  In adopting a 
reasonableness, rather than rationality, standard, Revlon and 
Unocal implicitly acknowledge that there is a predicate question 
that must be answered that is not typically at issue in a case 
governed by the business judgment rule. . . .  In a situation where 
heightened scrutiny applies, the predicate question of what the 
board’s true motivation was comes into play.  The court must 
take a nuanced and realistic look at the possibility that personal 
interests short of pure self-dealing have influenced the board to 
block a bid or steer a deal to one bidder rather than another.  
Through this examination, the court seeks to assure itself that the 
board acted reasonably, in the sense of taking a logical and 
reasoned approach for the purpose of advancing a proper 
objective, and to thereby smoke out mere pretextual justifications 
for improperly motivated decisions.  In this sense, the 
reasonableness standard requires the court to consider for itself 
whether the board is truly well motivated (i.e., is it acting for the 
proper ends?) before ultimately determining whether its means 
 
 143.  Id. at 45.  Even (c), judicial concern about actions that impede voting rights, does 
not automatically trigger enhanced business judgment.  See, e.g., City of Westland Police & 
Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., No. 4473-VCN, 2009 WL 3086537, at *7 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 28, 2009) aff’d, 1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010) (reviewing claims that board impeded 
shareholder voting rights under the business judgment rule); see also infra notes 212-215 
and accompanying text.  
 144.  14 A.3d 573 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 145.  Id. at 597. 
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were themselves a reasonable way of advancing those ends.
146
 
 
In explaining their reasons for applying enhanced business judgment 
in Revlon contexts, other courts have cited the language from Unocal and 
reasoned that there is an “omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders”
147
 both when boards employ defensive measures and when a 
change of control is imminent.
148
  In Smurfit-Stone, the court explained that 
“[h]eightened scrutiny is appropriate because of an ‘omnipresent specter’ 
that a board, which may have secured a continuing interest of some kind in 
the surviving entity, may favor its interests over those of the corporation’s 
stockholders.”
149
  In both Binks and Toys-R-Us, the respective courts 
specifically identified that their mandate was to determine whether the 
board made its Revlon decisions with improper motives.
150
  Similarly, in 
Pennaco, the court examined the board’s motives and concluded that it was 
not likely that the directors were “motivated by the desire for employment-
related benefits rather than their desire to receive the best price.”
151
 
It is not difficult to see that when corporations are in a Revlon mode, 
directors face the same type of motivational conflict that troubled the court 
in Unocal.  Both scenarios present the distinct possibility that directors may 
lose their jobs.  As such, Revlon cases present a conflict-lite issue:  are the 
directors motivated to seek the best financial deal for shareholders (as 
Revlon requires) or are the directors motivated to select a suitor that treats 
target management and directors well?
152
  As such, the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s decision to apply enhanced business judgment to Revlon contexts 
was sound.  Curiously, Delaware courts have ignored the fact that as 
 
 146.  Id. at 597–98. 
 147.  Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
 148.  See, e.g., Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del. 1990); Barkan v. 
Amsted Indus., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 
559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 
506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 
6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076, at *13 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2011); Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 
598 n. 180; In re Lukens Inc. Shareholders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 731 (Del. Ch. 1999) aff’d 
sub nom. Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000). 
 149.  Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *13. 
 150.  Binks v. DSL.net, Inc., No. 2823-VCN, 2010 WL 1713629, at *7–8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 
29, 2010); In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 1003 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 151.  In re Pennaco Energy, Inc., 787 A.2d 691, 707–08 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 152.  Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias, 32 
J. CORP. L. 833, 839 (2007) (positing that a board’s motives when the corporation is in a 
Revlon mode might be to select the bidder that offers retention or more generous severance 
to the directors and management).  
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Revlon contexts do not present a threat to corporate policy,
153
 Unocal’s first 
prong is entirely inapplicable.  The court’s nonchalant adoption of 
enhanced business judgment in Revlon contexts despite the fact that there is 
no threat to the corporation in this context reinforces the point that the 
essence of enhanced business judgment is whether the board acted 
reasonably.
154
 
In some respects, the Delaware courts allay their concern about the 
board’s true motives in Revlon contexts just as these courts resolved this 
elusive issue in Unocal—by examining whether directors caused harm to 
their shareholders.  If a board whose corporation is in a Revlon mode 
reasonably seeks to achieve profit maximization for its shareholders, the 
directors have not harmed their shareholders regardless of the board’s 
“true” motivation, and regardless of whether the directors have secured 
employment with the acquirer.  In other respects, the courts’ attempt to 
discern a board’s motive is easier when the target is in a Revlon mode, as 
opposed to a Unocal mode, and is easier still when the corporation is in a 
Revlon mode and faces offers from more than one bidder.  The court’s task 
is facilitated by Revlon’s mandate that requires the board to seek to 
maximize profits for its shareholders; that mandate provides a clear target 
against which a court can measure a board’s efforts.  Boards that are 
passive, or boards that favor a lower bid while in Revlon mode, simply 
make the case against themselves.  In contrast, since Unocal requires courts 
to make a judgment call regarding the reasonableness of a board’s response 
to a perceived corporate threat, the court’s evaluation is measured against 
an ambiguous standard that may be further complicated by the 
consideration of the impact of the offer on divergent constituencies.
155
 
As evidence that the Revlon mandate facilitates the court’s task, 
consider the nature of the cases that have failed Revlon.  Facts in six of the 
cases that failed Revlon, including the Revlon case itself, exposed the 
directors’ motivational conflict:  five cases involved management trying to 
further the deal that provided for their own continued participation, rather 
than the deal that was best for their shareholders,
156
 and in Revlon the 
directors, concerned about their potential liability to Revlon’s 
noteholders,
157
 favored the lower bidder who promised to shore up these 
devalued notes.  The facts of these cases facilitated the court’s ability to 
 
 153.  See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (recognizing that corporations in a Revlon mode 
do not face threats to “corporate policy and effectiveness” as they no longer seek to remain 
independent).  
 154.  See supra text at notes 134-135. 
 155.  See supra notes 87-88. 
 156.  See Siegel, supra note 13, at 629-32 nn.130-34 (identifying nature of cases that 
failed Revlon).  
 157.  Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179. 
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identify the directors’ motivational conflict, thereby making it fairly 
straight-forward to hold that the directors violated their fiduciary duties by 
acting in their own self-interest.  In two of the remaining three cases that 
failed Revlon, the directors revealed their motivational conflict by doing 
little or nothing to achieve their Revlon mandate.
158
  It is no surprise that no 
other fact pattern failed Revlon.  In virtually all other Revlon cases where 
there were either no bidders or only one bidder and the directors were not 
totally passive, Delaware courts found it challenging to identify whether 
the board acted based on its motivational conflict.
159
  Without objective 
evidence exposing the board’s conflict, courts were, as in Unocal, unable to 
conclude that directors acted in breach of their fiduciary duties. 
Although extending enhanced business judgment to another area of 
the law required minor adjustments,
160
 this extension to Revlon fact-
patterns proves both aspects of our theory about this standard of review.  
First, enhanced business judgment is designed to monitor motivational 
conflicts where concern exists that the directors are protecting their jobs or 
some other interest short of financial self-dealing.
161
  Second, although 
directors in a Revlon mode may show their own cards, the court’s inquiry 
about the directors’ motive remains whether the board has acted 
reasonably.  In evaluating whether the board’s response was reasonable, the 
court’s main concern is whether target directors have harmed their 
shareholders. 
Despite these similarities, Revlon fact-patterns pose one significant 
difference that the Delaware courts have ignored: Revlon fact patterns will 
often afford shareholders the opportunity to vote on the proposed 
transaction.
162
  In contrast, tender offer defensive tactics involve unilateral 
 
 158.  See Koehler v. NetSpend Holdings Inc., No. 8373-VCG, 2013 WL 2181518, at *20 
(Del. Ch. May 21, 2013) (finding unreasonable the board’s lack of a market check, reliance 
on a poor substitute for a market check, and use of deal protection devices); In re DeSoto, 
Inc. S’holder Litig., Nos. 11221, 11222 Consolidated, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 15 (Feb. 5, 
1990) (criticizing the board for failure to canvass the market of bidders). 
 159.  See Siegel, supra note 13, at 629-32 nn.130–134 (surveying Revlon cases).  
 160.  For example, since there is no threat to the continued existence of the corporation, 
Unocal’s prongs had to be modified to fit the Revlon scenario.  See supra note 153 and 
accompanying text. 
 161.  See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (expressing concern that the Revlon board’s 
decisions may have been influenced more by fear of potential liability to noteholders than 
strict adherence to its duty of loyalty to shareholders); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (expressing concern that directors’ may act out of a “desire 
to perpetuate themselves in office”). 
 162.  When a merger or sale of all assets puts the corporation in a Revlon mode, 
shareholders will vote on those transactions. Cf. Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Premiums in 
Stock-For-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of Director Fiduciary Duties, 
152 U. PA. L. REV. 881, 903 (2003) (arguing that courts should not apply enhanced scrutiny 
to a merger where shareholder approval is unimpaired regardless of whether the corporation 
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director action.  Noting this fact, the Delaware Supreme Court in Williams 
v. Geier reasoned, “A Unocal analysis should be used only when a board 
unilaterally . . . adopts defensive measures in reaction to a perceived 
threat.”
163
  The question of whether a shareholder vote, or at least a 
disinterested shareholder vote, constitutes a sufficient monitor of the 
transaction so as to obviate the need for enhanced judicial review is an 
important one in Delaware law and is further addressed in Part III.
164
 
2. Voting Issues 
In both Unocal and Revlon, the court’s decision to change the standard 
of review from business judgment to enhanced business judgment made it 
more difficult for directors to pass the new standard of review.  In contrast, 
one chancery court decision, Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Delaware), Inc.,
165
 
sought to replace the Blasius standard of review with enhanced business 
judgment, thereby lowering the standard of review.
166
  While concerns 
about motivational conflicts facing the board in both Unocal and Revlon 
prompted the court to apply enhanced business judgment so that it could 
examine the reasonableness of the board’s actions, Mercier’s proposal to 
utilize enhanced business judgment instead of Blasius was generated by 
entirely different concerns.  In Mercier, then Vice-Chancellor Strine 
eschewed the Blasius standard of review because “the trigger for the test’s 
application—director action that has the primary purpose of 
disenfranchisement—is so pejorative that it is more a label for a result than 
a useful guide to determining what standard of review should be used by a 
judge to reach an appropriate result.”
167
  In other words, the chancery 
court’s rejection of Blasius was based on its belief that Blasius is simply an 
unworkable standard of review, as once a court triggers Blasius, it would 
seem impossible for the directors to provide a compelling justification for 
disenfranchising their shareholders.
168
  Thus, Mercier’s argument for 
applying enhanced business judgment was based on the court’s view that a 
standard more viable than Blasius was needed to govern certain voting 
issues.
169
  The need for a more workable standard is particularly acute in 
 
is or is not in a Revlon mode). 
 163.  671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996).   
 164.  See discussion infra Part III.D (explaining the impact of certain shareholder votes 
on judicial review). 
 165.  929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 166.  Id. at 806. 
 167.  Id. 
 168.  See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 169.  Mercier, 929 A.2d at 806. See Allen et. al, supra note 44, at 1316 (“Since the early 
1990’s, the court of chancery and the Delaware [S]upreme [C]ourt began to ‘fold’ the 
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voting cases because, under current Delaware law, cases that fail to trigger 
Blasius review are governed by the business judgment rule.
170
 
The seeming futility of the Blasius standard of review, however, 
should not itself merit enhanced business judgment review for all voting 
issues.  The chancery court in Mercier, however, viewed the facts as 
presenting the same two issues endemic to enhanced business judgment 
review:  a board’s motivational conflict and whether the board’s response 
was reasonable.  As a result, in seeking to apply enhanced business 
judgment in a voting context,
171
 the court in Mercier proposed that 
plaintiffs would have to convince the court that the directors are motivated 
by an inherent conflict of interest involving their jobs.  If so, the directors 
would bear the burden of showing both a valid corporate purpose for their 
conduct and that their response was within the range of reasonableness.  
Specifically, the court in Mercier proposed modifying enhanced business 
judgment for the voting context so that the board would bear the following 
burden in the facts at hand: 
 
[T]o identify a legitimate corporate objective served by its 
decision to reschedule the . . . special meeting on the Mitel 
Merger and to set a new record date . . . the directors should bear 
the burden of persuasion to show that their motivations were 
proper and not selfish.  That showing, however, is not sufficient 
to ultimately prevail.  To ultimately succeed, the directors must 
show that their actions were reasonable in relation to their 
legitimate objective, and did not preclude the stockholders from 
exercising their right to vote or coerce them into voting a 
particular way.  If for some reason, the fit between means and end 
 
Blasius standard into Unocal, effectively making the former a subset of the latter.”); Cf. 
MM Companies, v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1129 (Del. 2003) (“This Court and 
the Court of Chancery have recognized the substantial degree of congruence between the 
rationale that led to the Blasius ‘compelling justification’ enhanced standard of judicial 
review and the logical extension of that rationale within the context of the Unocal enhanced 
standard of judicial review.”) (emphasis in original); see also Keyser v. Curtis, No. 7109-
VCN, 2012 WL 3115453, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2012) (deciding to apply entire fairness 
to the board’s decision to issue preferred stock despite court’s conclusion that such issuance 
was “the quintessential Blasius trigger”). 
 170.  See City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. Axcelis Technologies, Inc., 1 A.3d 
281 (Del. 2010) (applying the business judgment rule after rejecting the suggestion that 
Blasius was applicable); see also infra notes 212-215 and accompanying text. 
 171.  The court in Mercier considered a decision by a special committee of independent 
Inter-Tel directors to postpone a special meeting scheduled to submit a merger proposal for 
shareholder approval so as to provide shareholders additional information in the hope that 
they would approve the merger. Mercier, 929 A.2d at 797–804. 
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is not reasonable, the directors would also come up short.
172
 
 
Since both Unocal and Blasius require review of the board’s 
motivation, the court in Mercier assumed that this common core was a 
sufficient basis to substitute Unocal review for Blasius review.  That 
common core, however, misses the mark.  Mercier’s proposed substitution 
is inapt because it fails to recognize that the reasonableness review of 
Unocal is designed to give directors substantial leeway in making business 
decisions.  In contrast, as the court in Blasius pointed out, deciding who is 
on the board is a shareholder governance issue, not a business decision.
173
  
As a result, whether the directors acted reasonably, or even entirely 
reasonably, is irrelevant, as the decision was not within the directors’ 
domain. 
Thus, although Delaware courts might find the Blasius standard 
unworkable, utilizing Unocal review would require Delaware courts to 
make one of two changes to the logic of Blasius.  One option is to overrule 
that part of Blasius that reasoned that some aspects of governance are 
simply outside the directors’ managerial domain.
174
  If all matters, 
including who serves on the board, are in the directors’ domain, then the 
reasonableness review of Unocal would be appropriate.  The other option is 
to narrow within the voting issue those topics that merit Blasius review.  
For example, while the directors in Blasius acted to preclude the 
shareholders from electing certain candidates to the board, Mercier and 
several other voting cases reviewed under Blasius involved only either a 
temporary infringement on the shareholders’ voting rights, or a vote on a 
transaction, not on the election of directors.
175
 
 
 172.  Id. at 810–11.  Once the court determined that the Mercier board passed Unocal, it 
“reason[ed] backwards” and found that passing Unocal demonstrated that the board had a 
compelling justification for its actions.  See id. at 818–19 (finding that the primary purpose 
was to give stockholders more time to deliberate). 
 173.  See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659–60 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“A 
board’s decision to act to [interfere with the shareholder franchise] does not involve the 
exercise of the corporation’s power over its property . . . rather, it involves allocation, 
between shareholders as a class and the board, of effective power with respect to 
governance of the corporation.  [This decision] may not be left to the [board’s] business 
judgment.”) (emphasis in original). 
 174.  See id. at 660 (holding that board actions which involve the “exercise of the 
corporation’s power over its property, or with respect to its rights or obligations” are 
properly within directors’ domain, while board actions which invade “power with respect to 
governance of the corporation” properly reserved for shareholders are outside of the scope 
of directors’ authority) (emphasis in original).  
 175.  See infra notes 201-205 and accompanying text (comparing those voting cases 
about the election of directors that were decided under Blasius and those voting cases about 
other issues that were also decided under Blasius); see also infra notes 206-208 and 
accompanying text (discussing cases about delaying a shareholder vote that were reviewed 
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In sum, both Revlon fact patterns and voting fact patterns evince 
serious concerns regarding a board’s motivation for its actions.  Topics that 
generate a concern about the directors having a motivational conflict 
naturally create judicial interest in examining the reasonableness of the 
board’s decision.  In true Blasius cases, however, the reasonableness of the 
board’s decision is irrelevant under current Delaware law.  As such, subject 
to further consideration of whether a shareholder vote should change the 
standard of review,
176
 extending enhanced business judgment to Revlon fact 
patterns makes sense.  Voting cases, however, need further judicial pruning 
before they merit Unocal review, regardless of the unworkability of 
Blasius.  After suggesting ways to improve the enhanced business 
judgment standard of review, the next section will examine several topics 
that fit neatly into the paradigm thus far delineated for this standard. 
III. APPLYING ENHANCED BUSINESS JUDGMENT TO OTHER  
CONTEXTS 
Before examining other topics that might merit review under enhanced 
business judgment, two issues require consideration.  First, can enhanced 
business judgment be made into a stronger standard of review, even if not a 
truly intermediate standard?  Second, in considering scenarios to which 
enhanced business judgment could be applied because those topics meet 
the criteria that animated Unocal, should topics in which shareholders have 
a vote be removed from this heightened review because the shareholder 
vote itself provides some level of monitoring? 
A. Reformulating Enhanced Business Judgment into a Stronger 
Standard of Review 
Reformulating enhanced business judgment into a stronger standard of 
review is not as difficult as it might appear.  Since scholars and jurists 
agree that portions of two opinions from the Delaware Supreme Court, 
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
177
 and Unitrin, Inc. v. 
American General, Corp.,
178
 have weakened enhanced business judgment, 
reformulating this standard of review would require the Delaware Supreme 
Court to reconsider aspects of these opinions.  Specifically, in Time, the 
Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Time directors that the all cash, 
all shares offer by Paramount was a threat to Time’s corporate policy 
 
under enhanced business judgment).  
 176.  See infra Part III.D (discussing the role of the shareholder vote as a monitor). 
 177.  571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 178.  651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
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because Paramount’s offer was substantively coercive.
179
  Professors Gilson 
and Kraakman had defined substantive coercion as “the risk that 
shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they 
disbelieve management’s representations of intrinsic value.”
180
  These 
professors cautioned that the doctrine is premised on shaky grounds: 
 
To note abstractly that management might know shareholder 
interests better than shareholders themselves do cannot be a basis 
for rubber-stamping management’s pro forma claims in the face 
of market skepticism and the enormous opportunity losses that 
threaten target shareholders when hostile offers are defeated.  
Preclusive defensive tactics are gambles made on behalf of target 
shareholders by presumptively self-interested players.
181
 
 
In Time, the Delaware Supreme Court nevertheless embraced the 
doctrine of substantive coercion.
182
  On the eve of the vote on a Time-
Warner merger, Paramount made a substantially higher all cash, all shares 
offer for Time stock.
183
  Time responded by entering into an agreement to 
acquire Warner outright; the agreement included a provision legally 
binding Time to complete the transaction, thereby thwarting Paramount’s 
offer.
184
  The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Time board that 
Time stockholders might accept Paramount’s offer “in ignorance or a 
mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with 
 
 179.  Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1153. 
 180.  Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard For 
Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance To Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 258, 
267 (1989) (differentiating substantive coercion, “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly 
accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve management’s representations of 
intrinsic value,” from structural coercion, which the authors defined as “the risk that 
disparate treatment of non-tendering shareholders might distort shareholders’ tender 
decisions,” and also from opportunity loss, which the authors defined as the “dilemma that a 
hostile offer might deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select a superior 
alternative offered by target management.”). 
 181.  Id. at 274. 
 182.  Time, 571 A.2d at 1153 (defining substantive coercion as “the risk that 
shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve 
management’s representations of intrinsic value” and find that such risk was present because 
“Time shareholders might elect to tender to Paramount’s cash offer in ignorance or a 
mistaken belief of the strategic benefit which a business combination with Warner might 
produce.”). 
 183.  Id. at 1147 (finding that the “appeared accomplished fact” of the Time-Warner 
merger was “shattered by Paramount’s surprising announcement” of a substantially higher 
all-cash offer). 
 184.  Id. at 1148 (discussing the decision of Time’s board to “recast its consolidation 
with Warner into an outright cash and securities acquisition of Warner by Time . . . .”). 
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Warner might produce.”
185
  The Delaware Supreme Court also accepted the 
contention of Time’s board that the timing of the Paramount offer, coming 
only weeks before the Time shareholders were to vote on the proposed 
merger with Warner, may have been designed to “confuse” the Time 
stockholders.
186
  So viewed, the Delaware Supreme Court in Time 
permitted the board to satisfy Unocal’s first prong by reasoning that 
Paramount’s offer was a threat to the proposed Time-Warner merger,
187
 and 
Time’s response was neither draconian nor unreasonable because the Time 
board did only what it needed to do to effectuate that merger.
188
  In other 
words, since the Time board believed in the combination with Warner, it 
did not matter either to Time’s board or to the Delaware Supreme Court 
what Time’s shareholders wanted.  Instead, the Delaware Supreme Court 
viewed Unocal as requiring the court to let the target board further the 
course of action in which it believed.
189
 
The Delaware Supreme Court further embraced the doctrine of 
substantive coercion in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,
190
 where 
the target, Unitrin, proposed to implement both a stock repurchase and a 
poison pill in response to what the board viewed as an inadequate all cash 
offer from American General.  In citing with approval its reasoning in 
Time, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin stated that the Time board 
was concerned not only about the value of Paramount’s offer, but also that 
“the Time stockholders might tender to Paramount in ignorance or based on 
a mistaken belief, i.e., yield to substantive coercion.”
191
  Echoing its line of 
reasoning in Time, the court in Unitrin similarly stated that the Unitrin 
board “reasonably perceived risk of substantive coercion,”
192
 fearing that its 
shareholders would accept American General’s offer without understanding 
the Unitrin board’s “assessment of the long-term value of Unitrin’s 
stock.”
193
  The Delaware Supreme Court thus found the Unitrin board had 
identified a threat and that both of its defensive tactics were reasonable 
under Unocal.
194
 
 
 185.  Id. at 1153. 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. at 1153-54 (holding that the Time board’s decision that Paramount’s offer posed 
a threat to corporate policy and effectiveness satisfied Unocal’s first prong). 
 188.  Id. at 1154-55 (finding Time’s response satisfied Unocal’s second prong as it was 
reasonable for the board to pursue its goal of effectuating the desired transaction with 
Warner). 
 189.  Id. (claiming it would be a “distortion of the Unocal process” for the court to 
evaluate the merits of the various offers on the short and long-term value of Time). 
 190.  651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 191.  Id. at 1384. 
 192.  Id. at 1385. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id.  
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Not content simply to disagree with its chancery court, which had held 
that Unitrin’s stock repurchase program violated Unocal’s second prong, 
the Delaware Supreme Court held that the chancery court “erred by 
substituting its judgment, that the Repurchase Program was unnecessary, 
for that of the Board.”
195
  Through use of the word “unnecessary,” the 
Delaware Supreme Court suggested that the chancery court had used its 
business judgment to strike down the stock repurchase.  Lost in the 
Supreme Court’s analysis was that the chancery court’s reason for striking 
down the repurchase: given that the Unitrin board had already adopted a 
poison pill, not only was the repurchase unnecessary to protect the 
stockholders from an inadequate bid but the repurchase also made it 
extremely difficult for the offeror to wage a viable proxy contest.  Thus, in 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s charge that the chancery court violated 
Unocal by substituting its judgment as to what was necessary for that of the 
board, the chancery court thought it was fulfilling Unocal’s ultimate 
teaching: protect the shareholders’ right to vote their directors out of 
office.
196
 
While the Delaware Supreme Court believed its chancery court had 
attempted to invade the realm of the boards’ business judgment, it is 
arguable that the Delaware Supreme Court had instead simply been too 
deferential to the board’s decisions.  After all, enhanced business judgment 
was supposed to involve the court evaluating whether inherently-conflicted 
target directors had identified a cognizable threat and had responded 
reasonably.  In Time and Unitrin, enhanced business judgment morphed 
into whether the hostile offer was a threat to what the board wanted, and 
whether the board responded reasonably in protecting what it wanted. 
Some Delaware chancery courts have artfully criticized these aspects 
of Time and Unitrin.  One line of attack is that these cases demean target 
shareholders.  As then Vice-Chancellor Strine reasoned in Chesapeake v. 
Shore: “Our law should . . . hesitate to ascribe rube-like qualities to 
stockholders.  If stockholders are presumed competent to buy stock in the 
first place, why are they not presumed competent to decide when to sell in 
a tender offer after an adequate time for deliberation has been afforded 
them?”
197
 
Other chancery judges have openly stated their disagreement with the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s view of substantive coercion.  For example, in 
 
 195.  Id. at 1389. 
 196.  See supra text accompanying notes 70, 108 (noting that if shareholders were 
unhappy with the decision of their directors to employ defensive tactics, the shareholders 
possessed the power to remove their directors or vote for a new board). 
 197.  Chesapeake v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 328 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
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Air Products & Chemicals v. Airgas,
198
 the negotiations had produced Air 
Products’ final offer, which Airgas’ directors still found inadequate.  Thus, 
at this point in the negotiations, Airgas’ poison pill served only to prevent 
its shareholders from tendering to Air Products tender offer.  Noting that he 
did not agree with the Delaware Supreme Court’s view of substantive 
coercion, Chancellor Chandler reasoned that until the Supreme Court 
modifies its views on this topic, the chancery court had no option other 
than to allow the target board to keep its pill in place.
199
  In essence, the 
target board could prevent a hostile offer from succeeding not just 
temporarily, to produce a higher offer, but permanently, solely because the 
target directors continued to believe the offer was inadequate.  Leaving the 
offer to the judgment of the target shareholders, as Chancellor Chandler 
preferred, was not on the table. 
Thus, revitalizing enhanced business judgment requires recognizing 
that Unocal’s premise, namely, that target directors have an inherent 
conflict of interest, and the doctrine of substantive coercion, are largely 
incompatible.  Inherently conflicted directors should be able to employ 
defensive tactics to obtain a better deal, or to obtain time to inform their 
shareholders about why the board opposes the offer.  But inherently 
conflicted directors should not be allowed to say “not now, not ever.”  The 
doctrine of substantive coercion must eventually fall to the judgment of 
target shareholders.  When the Delaware Supreme Court is willing to so 
cabin the doctrine of substantive coercion, enhanced business judgment 
will become a stronger standard of review. 
B. Extending Enhanced Business Judgment to Other Contexts 
1. Voting 
The discussion above exposed that although Blasius might be a flawed 
standard of review, that observation alone does not merit relegating all 
voting issues to enhanced business judgment because some voting issues 
are not matters of the board’s business judgment.
200
  Thus, when presented 
with director conduct that impacts shareholders’ voting rights, Delaware 
courts should first differentiate between issues that are properly subject to 
 
 198.  16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
 199.  Id. at 101 (reasoning that “unless and until the Supreme Court rules otherwise,” the 
current state of Delaware law did not permit the court to require directors to dismantle its 
poison pill or submit the transaction to the shareholders for a vote). 
 200.  See supra text at note 173 (discussing that since who is on the board is not a proper 
subject for the directors’ business judgment, enhanced business judgment review is an 
inappropriate monitor for such decisions). 
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the directors’ business judgment and those that are not.  Currently, 
Delaware courts have applied Blasius review to five other voting cases.
201
  
Only Blasius and three of these other cases, however, merited Blasius 
review as these cases involved director action that, like Blasius itself, 
precluded shareholders from deciding who would sit on the board.
202
  The 
other two cases, Peerless and Mercier,
203
 did not warrant the Blasius review 
they received as these boards proposed only delaying a shareholder vote on 
issues unrelated to the election of directors.
204
  Thus, these latter cases 
should not have triggered Blasius review because they did not involve the 
directors usurping shareholder authority over who should serve on the 
board.
205
 
Once a voting case does not warrant Blasius review, the question 
becomes which other standard of review is appropriate.  In order to merit 
enhanced business judgment review, the court would have to decide that 
the directors faced a motivational conflict of interest.  Delaware courts 
have applied enhanced business judgment to two voting cases, Ahmanson
206
 
and Kidsco,
207
 involving target directors who delayed a shareholder vote on 
 
 201.  MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1120 (Del. 2003); 
Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007); Perlegos v. Atmel Corp., 
CIV.A. 2320-N, 2007 WL 475453 (Del. Ch. Feb. 8, 2007); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 
A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000); State of Wis. Inv. Bd. v. Peerless Sys. Corp., 2000 WL 1805376, 
at *2, *11–14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 4, 2000). 
 202.  The three cases that merited Blasius review were Liquid Audio, 813 A.2d at 1120 
(finding that increasing the size of the board from five to seven enabled the board to fill the 
new vacancies with loyal directors thus preventing any real challengers without directors 
offering a compelling justification for their actions), Perlegos, 2007 WL 475453 at *3–9 
(concluding that the board did not provide a compelling justification for cancelling a 
legitimately called shareholder election and thereby precluding the shareholders from 
voting), and Chesapeake, 772 A.2d at 297 (finding that the board intended to “interfere with 
or impede” the shareholder vote when the board adopted a bylaw that both eliminated the 
ability of shareholders to call a special meeting and raised the vote to amend the bylaws 
from a majority to a supermajority).  
 203.  Peerless, 2000 WL 1805376; Mercier, 929 A.2d at 786. 
 204.  See Peerless, 2000 WL 1805376, at *9–11 (noting that the defendant board delayed 
a proxy vote for thirty days because the board was concerned that shareholders would not 
pass a proposal); See also Mercier, 929 A.2d at 798 (stating that, “[t]he Special Committee 
delayed the vote precisely so that it could have more time to convince the stockholders to 
support the Merger.”). 
 205.  The court in Peerless clouded the issue of the applicability of Blasius review by 
suggesting that Blasius review is appropriate any time directors make any effort to alter the 
results of the vote.  Peerless, 2000 WL 1805376 at *19 (“It is clear, however, that 
adjournments that are specifically aimed at interfering with the results of a valid shareholder 
vote will bestir deep judicial suspicion.”). 
 206.  H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., No. CIV. A. 15650, 1997 WL 
305824 (Del. Ch. June 3, 1997). 
 207.  Kidsco Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483 (Del. Ch. 1995) aff’d and remanded, 670 
A.2d 1338 (Del. 1995). 
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a proposed merger into a white knight to buy more time to convince 
shareholders that the merger was a good idea.
208
  Since both mergers were 
defensive responses to hostile bids, both boards faced a motivational 
conflict that made enhanced business judgment the appropriate standard of 
review.  Similarly, the two cases that were wrongly decided under 
Blasius—Mercier and Peerless—would have been good candidates for 
enhanced business judgment review.  In both of these cases, the board 
temporarily delayed a shareholder vote on matters unrelated to the Blasius 
issue of who would select the board.  Furthermore, both cases involved 
motivational conflicts, thereby making enhanced business judgment review 
appropriate.  The facts in Mercier replicated those in Ahmanson and Kidsco 
in that the directors in Mercier postponed a special shareholder vote on a 
proposed merger so that the board could have additional time to convince 
its shareholders to vote for the proposed merger.
209
  Similarly, in Peerless, 
the board postponed a proxy vote for thirty days to have more time to 
convince its shareholders to vote for a proposal that would add 1,000,000 
shares to the Peerless stock option plan, an addition which would 
potentially benefit the Peerless directors.
210
  The court expressed concern 
over the directors’ efforts to use the postponement period to contact only 
those shareholders whom the board believed would vote for the pending 
proposal.
211
  As such, the Peerless directors had questionable motives for 
their actions, which warranted review under enhanced business judgment. 
Finally, voting cases that have been decided under the business 
judgment rule that present motivational conflicts are also candidates for 
enhanced business judgment review.  Perhaps the best example of a case 
that warranted review under enhanced business judgment instead of 
business judgment review is City of Westland Police & Fire Ret. Sys. v. 
Axcelis Technologies, Inc.
212
 In that case, the board had enacted a plurality-
plus voting policy that gave the board the discretion to reject resignations 
proffered by incumbent candidates who did not receive the support of a 
majority of the shares.
213
  When three directors failed to garner the requisite 
 
 208.  In Ahmanson, the court applied Unocal when the board delayed the shareholder 
vote by fifty days.  See Ahmanson, 1997 WL 305824 at *16.  Similarly, in Kidsco, the court 
applied Unocal review to the board’s response to a hostile takeover by delaying a 
shareholder vote on a proposed merger by twenty five days.  Kidsco, 674 A.2d at 468–89. 
 209.  See Mercier, 929 A.2d at 798 (“The Special Committee delayed the vote precisely 
so that it could have more time to convince the stockholders to support the Merger.”). 
 210.  Peerless, 2000 WL 1805376 at *9–11. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  1 A.3d 281 (Del. 2010). 
 213.  The plurality-plus election policy forced directors who received only a plurality of 
votes to submit their resignations to the board and further gave the sitting directors the 
power to accept or reject the proffered resignations.  Id. at 283–84. 
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vote, they submitted their resignations to the board, which then rejected 
those resignations.
214
  Although teeing up the issue of the board’s 
motivation,
215
 the court set it aside when it chose to apply the business 
judgment rule.  Instead, the motivational conflict that the directors 
potentially faced in choosing to keep their fellow directors on the board fit 
squarely within the parameters of enhanced business judgment review.  The 
concerns about the Westland board’s motives are reminiscent of the 
entrenchment issues that the Unocal board faced that originally prompted 
the Delaware Supreme Court to create the enhanced business judgment 
standard of review. 
2. Exclusive Forum Bylaws 
While Delaware courts have held that board-adopted forum-selection 
bylaws are valid
216
 and reviewable under the business judgment rule,
217
 a 
few judges and scholars have suggested that the board’s implementation of 
such bylaws may warrant a different standard of review.
218
  Such bifurcated 
review between adoption and implementation of these clauses has roots in 
Delaware corporate law; previously, the Delaware Supreme Court 
subjected a board’s adoption of a poison pill in advance of any takeover 
threat to business judgment rule review, while simultaneously holding that 
implementation of the pill could be reviewed under the enhanced business 
 
 214.  Id. at 291. 
 215.  “The question arises whether the directors, as fiduciaries, made a disinterested, 
informed business judgment . . . or whether the Board had some different, ulterior 
motivation.”  Id. at 291. 
 216.  Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. Ch. 
2013); Edgen Grp., Inc. v. Genoud, C.A., No. 9055-VCL, slip op. at 30 (Del. Ch. Nov. 5, 
2013) (describing forum-selection clauses found in bylaws as presumptively valid) (citing 
Boilermakers); cf. In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(implying forum-selection provisions in a charter are valid since charter provisions require 
both a board recommendation and shareholder approval).  But see Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. 
Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (holding a board-adopted forum-selection bylaw 
invalid under federal law). 
 217.  Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 949 (citing Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992) and 
Frantz Mfg. Co. v. EAC Indus., 501 A.2d 401 (Del. 1985) as the basis for its holding that 
adoption of such bylaws warrants review under the business judgment rule). 
 218.  Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate Litigation: 
Mandatory and Elective Approaches (The 2010 Pileggi Lecture) (Rock Center for Corporate 
Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561 (noting that as management’s incentives in litigation may 
be different from maximizing shareholders’ best interests, Unocal could monitor this 
concern); Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 953 (analogizing the factual scenario before it to the 
factual scenario confronted in Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), 
where the court left open the possibility that it would apply enhanced business judgment 
review in the future if the board implemented the poison pill it had adopted). 
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judgment rule.
219
  Similarly, in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. 
Chevron Corp., then Chancellor Strine upheld the adoption of a forum-
selection bylaw, but saved for another day ruling on the validity of a 
board’s decision to implement an exclusive-forum bylaw, reasoning that 
Delaware courts “decline[] to wade deeper into imagined situations 
involving multiple ‘ifs’ because rules on these situationally specific kind of 
issues should occur if and when the need for rulings is actually 
necessary.”
220
  As a result, even though Delaware courts deem the board’s 
adoption of forum bylaws to be a valid exercise of power, courts may apply 
a more searching scrutiny when a board actually implements such clauses. 
In Boilermakers, then Chancellor Strine stated that the court would 
review implementation of a forum-selection bylaw under the test 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.,
221
 a case involving an international towing contract: “[T]his 
court will enforce the forum selection bylaws in the same way it enforces 
any other forum selection clause, in accordance with the principles set 
down by the United States Supreme Court in Bremen.”
222
  The Bremen test 
requires a court to enforce such a clause absent a showing that 
“enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust,”
223
 or that the clause was 
invalid because it was affected by “fraud, undue influence, or overweening 
bargaining power.”
224
  The forum-selection clause in Bremen, however, 
involved two parties to a contract.
225
 In contrast, forum-selection bylaws 
involve only one party—who unilaterally both adopts and implements the 
clause—and who is a fiduciary to the other party.  As a result, the Bremen 
analogy is not quite apt for review of forum-selection bylaws.
226
 
 
 219.  Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (ruling that “the ultimate response to an actual takeover 
bid must be judged by the Directors’ actions at that time”). 
 220.  Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 962.  Chancellor Strine cited to Moran in his decision, 
suggesting that, similar to the poison pill in Moran, implementation of an exclusive forum 
bylaw may well be subject to a higher standard of review.  Id. at 949 n.59 (emphasis in 
original). 
 221.  407 U.S. 1 (1972). 
 222.  Boilermakers, 73 A.3d at 940.  The court in Boilermakers implied that it might 
apply more searching scrutiny than is done under the business judgment rule, but 
specifically mentioned review under only Bremen & Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 
285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).  Id. at 940, 949.  But see Mary Siegel, Going Private: Three 
Doctrines Gone Astray, 4 N.Y.U.J. L. & BUS. 399, 420 (2008) (demonstrating that Schnell is 
best cabined to voting issues). 
 223.  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15. 
 224.  Id. at 12. 
 225.  Id. at 2-3 (describing the exchange between two parties and noting that while one 
party drafted the original contract, the other reviewed it and made several changes before 
accepting the contract). 
 226.  When instituting suit, contract parties must abide by the forum-selection clause.  In 
contrast, a forum-selection bylaw differs in that directors owe fiduciary duties to the 
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While directors have many valid reasons to implement forum-
selection clauses,
227
 the advantages that directors reap from implementing 
such clauses can certainly generate a motivational conflict for the board.  
For example, the forum the directors select through either a mandatory or 
elective forum clause
228
 can deter meritorious suits by making it 
geographically difficult for plaintiff to pursue its action,
229
 decreasing 
incentives for plaintiff’s counsel to pursue the lawsuit,
230
 or imposing more 
 
corporation and to the shareholders.  The addition of a fiduciary component to the 
relationship between parties means that a higher standard of conduct is expected.  Cf. 
Monica E. White, “Package Deal”: The Curious Relationship Between Fiduciary Duties 
and the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Delaware Limited Liability 
Companies, 21 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 111, 130 (2013) (comparing and contrasting the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the fiduciary duty of good faith in 
Delaware law). 
 227.  The most often cited reason for directors adopting forum-selection clauses is that 
multi-forum litigation regarding a single corporate action imposes a high cost on the 
corporation.  Such litigation is expensive, regardless of the merits of the shareholders’ 
claims.  Joseph A. Grundfest & Kristen A. Savelle, The Brouhaha Over Intra-Corporate 
Forum-selection Provisions: A Legal, Economic, and Political Analysis, 68 BUS. LAW. 325, 
338, 346 (2013).  Multi-forum litigation concerning a single action also introduces the 
potential for “opportunistic settlements.”  Id. at 329.  Beyond the financial costs, multi-
forum litigation potentially exposes corporations to “conflicting outcomes in different 
jurisdictions in the same case.”  Thomas T. McClendon, The Power of A Suggestion: The 
Use of Forum-Selection Clauses by Delaware Corporations, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2067, 
2116 (2012).  Note that each of these examples seeks to maximize the corporation’s profits. 
The directors’ motivation differs from the motivation of the suing shareholders’ attorneys 
who act not to maximize the corporation’s profits, but to maximize the counsel fees they can 
collect.  See Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate 
Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches (The 2010 Pileggi Lecture) (Rock Center 
for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561 (noting that Plaintiff’s counsel might prefer a 
jurisdiction that awards higher attorney fees even if it is less lucrative for investors). 
 228.  Forum-selection provisions can be either mandatory or elective, also referred to as 
permissive.  Mandatory forum-selection provisions limit shareholder suits to the jurisdiction 
specified in the provision.  Elective, or permissive, forum-selection provisions give directors 
discretion either to consent to the jurisdiction chosen by the suing shareholders or require 
litigation to proceed in the jurisdiction specified in the provision. 
 229.  See GLASS LEWIS & CO., Proxy Talk: Amalgamated Bank Discusses Exclusive 
Forum Shareholder Proposal at Chevron (May 17, 2012), 
http://www.glasslewis.com/about-glass-lewis/press-releases/ (raising several issues about 
the negative impact of a forum-selection clause, including that it allows the corporation to 
engage in gamesmanship to the detriment of plaintiffs and may force litigation into a 
jurisdiction that may not be the most efficient for the particular litigation). 
 230.  See John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 
IND. L.J. 1345, 1367–72 (2012) (finding that negative Delaware judicial attitudes towards 
plaintiffs’ counsel and their fees might have an impact on the recent trend of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys fleeing filing in Delaware); Sara Lewis, Transforming the “Anywhere but 
Chancery” Problem into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 
199, 200–02 (2008) (arguing that shareholders’ attorneys are increasingly suing 
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stringent pleading or substantive requirements on plaintiff.
231
  
Alternatively, directors can use the power of this clause to extract a 
“sweetheart settlement.”
232
  If a court determines that directors faced a 
motivational conflict when they implemented a forum bylaw, the court 
could hold that enhanced business judgment is the appropriate standard of 
review. 
If a court were to apply enhanced business judgment review to 
implementation of these clauses, it would have to consider whether the 
board’s decision was reasonable and the extent of the harm that decision 
caused shareholders.
233
  Presumably, it would always be reasonable for 
directors of Delaware corporations to want to keep lawsuits in front of 
Delaware judges.  To the extent, however, that such a clause empowers a 
 
corporations in jurisdictions other than Delaware to avoid what is viewed as the pro-
corporation efficiency and predictability of Delaware courts). 
 231.  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000) (explaining the 
heightened pleading standards required in derivative suits in Delaware); Pirelli Armstrong 
Tire Corp. Retiree Med. Benefits Trust ex rel. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. Raines, 534 F.3d 
779, 783 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (characterizing Delaware’s demand futility requirement as setting 
the bar high and requiring stringent standards). 
 232.  See Joseph A. Grundfest, Choice of Forum Provisions in Intra-Corporate 
Litigation: Mandatory and Elective Approaches (The 2010 Pileggi Lecture) (Rock Center 
for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 91, 2010), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1690561 (“The rationale for such a standard relates to the 
potential danger of a sweetheart settlement that parallels the danger of entrenchment in the 
Unocal situation.”); cf. Note, When Should Courts Allow the Settlement of Duty-of-Loyalty 
Derivative Suits?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1087 (1996) (highlighting the danger of 
sweetheart settlements in derivative suits).  Concern about the board’s motivations may be 
the underlying reason that some proxy-advisor firms recommend voting against directors 
who support these provisions.  See Claudia H. Allen, Study of Delaware Forum-selection in 
Charters and Bylaws (Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP) (January 25, 2012), at 6, available at 
http://www.ngelaw.com/files/Uploads/Images/StudyofDelawareForum012512.pdf. 
 233.  This review mirrors the reasonableness analysis envisioned by the Court in Bremen 
in that it focuses on the effect of the clause’s implementation.  See Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15–17 (1972) (implying enforcement of a forum-selection clause 
would be unreasonable if it were contrary to public policy or forced litigation into a remote 
foreign forum).  Just as Unocal’s second prong allows the court to review harm to the 
corporation and its shareholders, Bremen’s reasonableness standard permits the court to 
analyze harm to the contracting parties.  However, reasonableness analysis under the 
enhanced business judgment rule is meant to be more delving than it is under Bremen.  
Review under Bremen considers only the facial reasonableness of the forum-selection 
clause.  See id. at 15–18 (finding the forum-selection clause reasonable given that it did not 
conflict with the forum’s public policy, the chosen forum wasn’t seriously inconvenient, and 
the contract containing the forum-selection clause was freely negotiated).  In contrast, 
reasonableness review under enhanced business judgment is designed to be somewhat 
probing.  See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (describing 
the reasonableness test under Unocal as examining whether the directors’ beliefs were 
reasonable, whether the directors reasonably investigated those beliefs, and whether the 
directors’ actions in response were reasonable).   
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board with a useful club against plaintiffs’ lawyers who eschew Delaware 
courts (known to be less generous with plaintiffs’ counsel fees than other 
jurisdictions),
234
 Delaware courts could use enhanced business judgment 
review to ensure that these parties have not reached a sweetheart settlement 
for themselves at the expense of their shareholders.
235
 
C. The Costs and Benefits of Extending Enhanced Business Judgment 
Review 
Increasing review to enhanced business judgment for topics that are 
currently reviewed under the business judgment rule would require boards 
to justify the reasonableness of their actions in implementing exclusive 
forum bylaws or in unilaterally-adopted board voting policies.  This 
increase in the standard of review means a transfer of discretion from 
directors to courts.  Commentators will differ on whether this transfer of 
power yields a cost or a benefit.  Perhaps a clearer cost of extending 
enhanced review is increased uncertainty, as parties will not know ex ante 
whether a judge will find the board’s actions to be reasonable. 
In contrast, reviewing topics under enhanced business judgment that 
are currently viewed under Blasius creates a distinct benefit for directors 
who would move from having to provide a compelling reason for their 
actions to the far lesser standard of demonstrating the reasonableness of 
their actions.  Since courts have framed the Blasius trigger as whether 
directors’ primary purpose is to disenfranchise their shareholders,
236
 these 
cases are perfectly tailored to Unocal’s focus on the board’s motivation.  It 
is therefore likely that shareholders will not suffer a loss from Unocal’s 
 
 234.  See Armour, Black, & Cheffins, supra note 230, at 1367–72. 
 235.  For example, directors could trade off a larger settlement in exchange for an 
agreement that the directors had not breached their fiduciary duties.  Moreover, Delaware 
courts could use enhanced business judgment review to protect shareholders from directors 
pursuing more expensive litigation in faraway jurisdictions in hopes of obtaining a better 
result for themselves.  Some argue that plaintiffs’ lawyers increasingly pursue shareholder 
litigation outside of Delaware because some foreign jurisdictions apply Delaware law 
differently from Delaware courts, or apply their own law, which does not comport with 
Delaware law.  See, e.g., Sara Lewis, Transforming the “Anywhere but Chancery” Problem 
into the “Nowhere but Chancery” Solution, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199, 200–02 (2008) 
(noting that non-Delaware courts may not be consistent in applying Delaware law because 
non-Delaware judges are either unfamiliar with Delaware law or are hostile to it).  By 
implementing a forum-selection clause, directors could take a similar approach, effectively 
paying an increased price at the corporation’s expense to “roll the dice” in a less predictable 
jurisdiction.   
 236.  See supra text at note 15 (stating that the Blasius test applies when directors’ 
primary purpose is to disenfranchise shareholders and must demonstrate a compelling 
justification to justify their actions). 
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less demanding standard of review if courts apply Unocal’s reasonableness 
test to directors’ efforts to merely postpone shareholder votes, rather than 
to outright disenfranchise their shareholders.
237
 
D. What Effect Should A Shareholder Vote Have On The Standard of 
Review? 
In Gantler v. Stephens, a case not involving enhanced review, the 
Delaware Supreme Court clarified the scope and effect of the doctrine of 
shareholder ratification: 
 
We hold that the scope of the shareholder ratification doctrine 
must be limited to its so-called ‘classic’ form; that is, to 
circumstances where a fully informed shareholder vote approves 
director action that does not legally require shareholder approval 
in order to become legally effective.  Moreover, the only director 
action or conduct that can be ratified is that which the 
shareholders are specifically asked to approve.  With one 
exception, the ‘cleansing’ effect of such a ratifying shareholder 
vote is to subject the challenged director action to business 
judgment review, as opposed to ‘extinguishing’ the claim 
altogether (i.e., obviating all judicial review of the challenged 
action.)
238
 
Thus, under the holding in Gantler, directors submitting their actions 
or transactions to a shareholder vote where no such vote is required could 
change the standard of review from enhanced business judgment to the 
business judgment rule.  This extension of Gantler is consistent with 
Williams v. Geier, where the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “[a] 
Unocal analysis should be used only when a board unilaterally . . . adopts 
defensive measures.”
239
  Since some of the existing topics and all proposed 
topics for enhanced review do not require a shareholder vote, boards 
theoretically have many opportunities to change the standard to business 
 
 237.  See supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text (dissecting cases that were 
decided under Blasius and categorizing those that rightfully belonged under Blasius and 
those that did not). 
 238.  965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also 
Hamermesh, supra note 162, at 893 (arguing that a less intrusive level of judicial scrutiny 
would be more appropriate where there is an uncoerced and fully informed shareholder 
vote); cf. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013) (switching the standard 
of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule in a going-private merger 
because both a committee of independent directors and a majority-of-the-minority shares 
approved the transaction).  
 239.  671 A.2d 1368, 1377 (Del. 1996) (emphasis added). 
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judgment.  Note, however, that the Delaware Supreme Court in In re Santa 
Fe Pacific Corporation Shareholder Litigation distinguished the effect of 
voting on the proposed merger from voting on the defensive measures: 
“[s]ince the stockholders of Santa Fe merely voted in favor of the merger 
and not the defensive measures, we decline to find ratification in this 
instance.”
240
 
One might question, however, whether the Gantler logic holds when 
applied to some existing or proposed issues subject to enhanced review.  
No doubt, shareholders are able to make effective voting choices on issues 
directly relating to their financial self-interest.
241
  Application of the 
Gantler logic to those Revlon transactions (which do not statutorily require 
shareholder approval) and to non-Blasius voting issues on transactions 
makes sense, as shareholders are able to decide what is in their financial 
self-interest.  One step removed yet close enough to a transaction is the 
case of a target board voluntarily submitting proposed defensive tactics to 
their shareholders for a vote in the midst of a hostile tender offer.  This 
scenario is analogous to a transaction because shareholders have a similar 
financial stake in selling their shares in a tender offer.  Therefore, if the 
target directors ceded the right to decide on defensive tactics to their 
shareholders in the face of a hostile offer, the directors would shed their 
taint of improper motivation.
242
  Directors submitting defensive tactics to a 
shareholder vote is an unlikely scenario, however, given that shareholders 
are likely to prefer the premium typically offered in a tender offer. 
The Gantler logic becomes more questionable when applied to other 
contexts that are covered, or proposed to be covered, by enhanced business 
judgment that are not transaction specific.  Specifically, if defensive tactics 
 
 240.  669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 
2009) (reasoning that “the only director action or conduct that can be ratified is that which 
the shareholders are specifically asked to approve.”). 
 241.  Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010) 
(“[S]tockholders with economic ownership are expressing their collective view as to 
whether a particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth 
maximization.”); Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 845 (Del. 1987) 
(“Stockholders in Delaware corporations have a right to control and vote their shares in their 
own interest . . . It is not objectionable that their motive may be for personal profit.”); 
Hamermesh, supra note 162, at 893 (“A more intrusive level of judicial involvement 
undervalues the significance of the shareholder franchise and the ability of shareholders to 
make effective voting choices as to issues affecting their financial interests.”); cf. Julian 
Velasco, Taking Shareholder Rights Seriously, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 605, 623 (2007) 
(asserting that shareholders are likely to be better informed regarding “very important 
matters”). 
 242.  Cf. Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310, 313 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(reasoning that one factor that helped the target board pass Unocal review was that the 
board would submit the poison pill to a stockholder vote that year, “a feature that further 
limits its inhibiting potency”). 
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are merely anticipatory, the shareholder vote would lose much of the 
efficacy it has in the face of an actual offer.  Similarly, a non-Blasius 
voting issue that does not relate to a transaction loses much of the force that 
is otherwise inherent in a shareholder vote on a transaction.
243
  The weakest 
scenario for changing the standard of review would be a vote on the 
implementation of exclusive forum bylaws.  Typically, shareholders have 
little self-interest in derivative actions as the recovery from such suits goes 
to the corporation’s coffers, not directly to shareholders.
244
  In addition to 
their lack of self-interest, shareholders would have little ability to evaluate 
the merits of a complaint and the likelihood of its success so as to decide 
whether the directors would be motivated to negotiate a sweetheart 
settlement.  Therefore, the shareholders’ vote on the board’s 
implementation of an exclusive-forum bylaw serves as a weak monitor. 
This is not to say that if shareholders are given the opportunity to vote 
on an issue and do not pay sufficient attention that courts are obligated to 
fill in this gap with enhanced review.  Instead, the point is that the policy 
behind switching the standard of review due to sufficient policing through a 
shareholder vote is, in reality, unlikely to be meaningful if shareholders 
lack a sufficient self-interest. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the policy issues supporting the business judgment rule, 
entire fairness, and Blasius review are broad and deep, there are some old, 
new, and developing scenarios where the directors’ decisions do not fit 
neatly into any of these standards of review.  Enhanced business judgment 
review, therefore, is an invaluable addition to the array of standards of 
review.  By segmenting out motivational conflicts, this Article not only 
explains why enhanced business judgment review was appropriate in 
Unocal and Revlon, but also provides courts with tools to evaluate when 
extending enhanced review to other scenarios would be appropriate.  While 
this Article offers up two examples for extension of enhanced review, no 
 
 243.  See Velasco, supra note 241, at 623 (addressing the argument that shareholders are 
apathetic towards “ordinary” corporate matters and arguing that it is rational for 
shareholders to be less invested in and informed about such matters); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 
699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (reviewing the effect of shareholder ratification of a director 
compensation plan, and exemplifying the difference in force of a shareholder vote that does 
not relate to a transaction). 
 244.  Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 146 (2007) (“Individual shareholders often would seem to 
lack sufficient economic incentive to bring a derivative suits.  Derivative lawsuits are, 
nevertheless, made possible because of the incentives for plaintiff’s counsel.”). 
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doubt other scenarios will present themselves in the future. 
  
SIEGEL_FINAL (ARTICLE 2).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/15/2015  4:52 PM 
100 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 17:1 
 
 
 
